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FAMILY VALUES AND THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE: A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE
BANKRUPTCY BENEFITS AWARDED ON THE
BASIS OF MARITAL STATUS
A. Mechele Dickerson*
INTRODUCTION
C ONGRESS recently passed a law that states that only persons of
the opposite sex who are in marriages authorized by the State are
entitled to federal benefits awarded to married persons. Specifically,
the "Defense of Marriage Act" provides that, for the purposes of any
federal act, ruling, or regulation, marriage means a "legal union be-
tween one man and one woman as husband and wife" and spouse
means "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of
William and Mary. A.B., Harvard-Radcliffe (1984); J.D., Harvard Law School (1988).
I am grateful to Dean Nancy Rapoport, Professors Peter Alexander, Stuart R. Cohn,
and Marjorie Girth and my faculty colleagues, Peter Alces, Neal Devins, Cynthia
Ward, and Richard Williamson for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
This project would not have been possible without research assistance provided by
Robert Chandler, Tanya Powell, and Beth Benko and Felicia A. Burton's cheerful
word processing support. This project was supported, in part, by a grant provided by
the College of William and Mary.
1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996). Congress passed this
Act when it appeared that Hawaii might allow gay couples to obtain marriage
licenses. The Hawaii legislature ultimately refused to allow same-sex marriages and
subsequently adopted legislation similar to the Defense of Marriage Act. See Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (Supp. 1998) (defining marriage contract as one "between a man
and a woman"). Other states followed suit and passed similar statutes. See, e.g., Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-11-109 (Michie Supp. 1998) (defining marriage as only between a man
and a woman and declaring void all marriages between persons of the same sex); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 741.212 (3) (\Vest 1997) (explaining that "the term 'marriage' means only
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the term
'spouse' applies only to a member of such a union"); Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-3.1(a)
(Supp. 1998) ("It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union
only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited
in this state."); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 89 (West 1997) ("Persons of the same sex may
not contract marriage with each other."); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.1 (\Vest
Supp. 1998) ("Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a wo-
man. As a matter of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging,
supporting, and protecting that unique relationship in order to promote, among other
goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children. A marriage contracted
between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state."); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1704 (West Supp. 1998) ("It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding
public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one
woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in an-
other state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in
this Commonwealth.").
In response to the possibility that a sister state might allow same-sex couples to
marry, North Dakota passed contingent legislation. See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-03-01,
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While courts or agencies who interpret federal acts, including the
Bankruptcy Code ("The Code"),' are now required to recognize only
heterosexual marriages authorized by a state, it is unclear why federal
bankruptcy benefits should be granted based on marital status. En-
couraging, supporting, and protecting marriage is not one of the goals
of federal bankruptcy laws. Instead, bankruptcy laws have two pri-
mary goals: to give honest debtors a financial "fresh start" in life, and
to ensure that creditors receive maximum, equitable debt repayment.3
These objectives are implemented through the Code's statutory
framework, which is designed to govern a debtor's current and future
relationship with third-party creditors. Generally speaking, the
Code's framework helps individual debtors either to restructure and
repay some of their debts in Chapter 134 or to discharge debts in
Chapter 7.5
In its rush to vilify same sex unions,6 Congress failed to explain why
any federal benefits should be granted based simply on a person's de-
cision (or ability) to marry. A married person who files a bankruptcy
petition receives the following benefits simply because of marital sta-
tus: the right to file a joint petition; 7 the ability (under some circum-
stances) to shield certain property from the reach of creditors;8 the
right to budget for expenses for a "dependent" non-debtor spouse;9
-08 (1997) (defining spouse as a "person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife"
only if another state recognizes marriages between people of the same sex).
2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
3. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994).
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
5. See id. § 706-728. Individuals can also use Chapter 11 to restructure and re-
pay debts if their combined debt exceeds Chapter 13's eligibility limits. See id.
§ 109(e). Business debtors may liquidate under Chapter 7 and may reorganize or
liquidate under Chapter 11. See id. § 101(41), 109(b), 1123(a)(5)(D).
6. For example, during the debate on the Defense of Marriage Act, Senator Jesse
Helms (R-NC) made the following statement: "[I]nch by inch, little by little, the ho-
mosexual lobby has chipped away at the moral stamina of some of America's courts
and some legislators, in order to create the shaky ground that exists today that
prompts this legislation being the subject of debate . 142 Cong. Rec. S1O,068
(daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (noting that debtor and spouse may file joint petition); see
also infra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional intent
behind § 302).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (explaining that debtors can exempt any interest the
debtor has in property owned by a tenant by the entirety); id. § 522(d) (noting that
debtor can exempt the debtor's interest in property a dependent uses as a residence);
id. § 524(a)(3); In re Homan, 112 B.R. 356, 359-60 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989) (discussing
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(3)); In re Strickland, 153 B.R. 909, 912-13 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993)
(same); In re Smith, 140 B.R. 904 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1992) (same); see also infra notes
135-48 and accompanying text (describing the protection from creditors afforded a
debtor spouse's property that is held in tenancy by the entirety); infra notes 157-59,
162 and accompanying text (commenting on a debtor spouse's ability to claim a non-
debtor spouse as a dependent under § 522(d)).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (noting that Chapter 13 debtors may exclude from
their "disposable" income any expenses reasonably necessary to be expended for the
maintenance or support of a dependent of the debtor); see also infra notes 161-63 and
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and the ability to protect a non-debtor spouse from certain creditor
collection activities. 10 Due in part to the dramatic increase in bank-
ruptcy filings by individuals," Congress is currently reevaluating the
type of relief individuals should receive when they file a bankruptcy
petition.'2 As part of this reform process, Congress should ask
whether-notwithstanding the policy expressed in the Defense of
Marriage Act-certain debtors should be entitled to extra benefits
based simply on their choice or ability to marry.
This Article considers the role of marital status in federal bank-
ruptcy laws and argues that Congress should ignore marital status
when awarding benefits to debtors in bankruptcy cases. Part I of this
Article discusses the historical justifications given for protecting and
promoting the institution of marriage. This part traces the dramatic
changes both in the nature and permanency1 3 of modern intimate rela-
accompanying text (explaining that a debtor may enjoy the protections of this section
without proving the non-debtor spouse's financial dependence).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (stating that if the bankruptcy estate included community
property and the bankruptcy case discharged community claims, discharge is effective
against community creditors of the non-debtor and debtor spouse); see also id.
§§ 1201,1301 (noting that creditors stayed from collecting co-signed debts during pen-
dency of Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases); infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text
(noting that the benefits of sections 1201 and 1301 extend to all non-debtor
cohabitants).
11. In 1997, 1.3 million individuals filed bankruptcy petitions. See U.S. Banknptcy
Filings 1980-1997 (Business, Non-Business, Total) (visited Aug. 11, 1998) <http:/l
www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html> (showing increase in filings since 1980).
This is an increase of almost 200% since 1990. See id.
12. Largely in response to recommendations made in the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission's October 1997 Report, National Bankruptcy Review Comm'n,
Bankruptcy: The Next 20 Years (1997), a number of bills designed to reform per-
ceived abuses in the bankruptcy system were introduced in Congress during the 1997-
98 session. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150. 105th Cong. (1998)
(precluding individuals from filing for complete relief in bankruptcy under Chapter 7
liquidation if they are deemed to have the means to pay creditors): Consumer Lend-
ers and Borrowers Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998, H.R. 3146, 105th Cong.
(1998) (amending federal bankruptcy law to expand the list of creditors' claims); Reli-
gious Fairness in Bankruptcy Act of 1997, H.R. 2611, 105th Cong. (1997) (modifying
federal bankruptcy law with respect to religious donations); Religious Liberty and
Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2604, 105th Cong. (1997) (ex-
panding debtors' right to make charitable contributions); Private Trustee Reform Act
of 1997, H.R. 2592, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending courts' authority to determine the
necessary expenses of trustees); Responsible Borrower Act of 1997, H.R. 2500, 105th
Cong. (1997) (prescribing guidelines for a needs based bankruptcy system); Credit
Card Consumer Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 1975, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending the
Truth in Lending Act); Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1997, S. 1301, 105th
Cong. (1997) (amending the requirements for converting a Chapter 7 case to a Chap-
ter 12 or Chapter 13 case); Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act
of 1998, S. 1244, 105th Cong. (1997) (expanding debtors' right to make charitable
contributions).
13. It is reported that half of all marriages will end in divorce. See Leah Guggen-
heimer, A Modest Proposa The Femninomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements, 17
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 147, 149 (1996) ("The current divorce rate is almost one in two,
as compared to greater than one in three in 1945. In urban areas, the divorce rate
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tionships between spouses and notes that the State no longer dictates
the manner in which married couples govern their economic inter-
spousal affairs. Part II examines the hostility courts and legislators
have traditionally exhibited when asked to give legal recognition or
benefits to unmarried couples. This part shows that, largely in re-
sponse to the dramatic increase in the number of both heterosexual
and homosexual couples who cohabit but are not legally married, 14
modern courts and legislators are generally willing to extend at least
some limited legal protections to unmarried cohabitants.
Part III examines non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy laws' treatment
of married and unmarried couples. This part argues that the current
interpretation and application of these laws disparately treats married
and unmarried couples. Because the historical justifications for the
disparate treatment of married and unmarried couples no longer exist,
part IV concludes by proposing that Congress give bankruptcy bene-
fits to any married or unmarried "economic unit" that jointly pools
resources, jointly incurs debts, and jointly agrees to have one member
of the unit give economical support to the other member. 15
exceeds 50 percent, and in most large cities and their surrounding suburbs there are
more divorces each year than marriages."); Amy L. Wax, Against Nature-On Robert
Wright's the Moral Animal, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 307, 347 n.66 (1996) (citing Council on
Families in America, Marriage in America: A Report to the Nation (Institute for
American Values 1995)).
14. According to United States Census reports, the number of unmarried couple
households numbered 439,000 in 1960, 523,000 in 1970, 1,589,000 in 1980, 2,856,000 in
1990, 3,668,000 in 1995, and 4,130,000 in 1997. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statisti-
cal Abstract of the United States 56 (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter Statistical Abstract];
Census Bureau, Marital Status and Living Arrangements (last modified March, 1997)
<http://www.census.dove/prod/3/98pubs/p20-5060updf>. Moreover, the percentage of
adults who are married was 65.6% in 1980, but is now reported to be 60.3%. See
Statistical Abstract, supra, at 54.
15. This Article does not consider whether marital status is relevant when granting
federal benefits other than bankruptcy benefits, nor does it address whether states
should permit same sex marriages. These issues have been exhaustively treated else-
where. See, e.g., James W. Button et al., Private Lives, Public Conflicts (1997) (analyz-
ing the adoption and implementation of gay rights legislation); Richard D. Mohr, A
More Perfect Union (1994); Same Sex Marriage (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosen-
baum eds., 1997) (offering individual perspectives on legalizing same-sex marriage);
Vada Berger, Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 417 (1991) (analyz-
ing the benefits and drawbacks of domestic partnership initiatives); Amy R. Brown-
stein, Why Same-Sex Spouses Should Be Granted Preferential Immigration Status:
Reevaluating Adams v. Howerton, 16 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 763 (1994) (exam-
ining current treatment by United States courts of same-sex marriage for immigration
purposes); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev.
1419 (1993) (discussing the history of same-sex marriage and its implications); An-
drew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scrip-
tural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 How. L.J. 173
(1992) (examining the religious foundation of legal prohibitions against same-sex
marriage); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev.
1164 (1992) (analyzing and proposing improvements in domestic relations law); Rob-
ert L. Cordell II, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage and
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I. PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE INSTITUTION
OF MARRIAGE
16
Historically, marriage was a public matter, not a private concern of
two individuals. At common law, the act of marriage merged two be-
ings into one.' 7 Marriage, as a legal "status," was defined and regu-
lated by the State.'" As participants in this status-based relationship,
spouses were defined by their roles as wives or husbands and were
bound by legal restrictions that largely disregarded their personal
preferences or desires.' 9 For example, because the State dictated all
terms of the marital relationship, neither party could terminate the
relationship (i.e., divorce) unless there was proof that one of them had
engaged in behavior inconsistent with the duties of marriage.20 Thus,
when marriage was a merger, spouses were required to show "fault"
before the State would terminate the marriage.21 Indeed, in almost all
an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 247 (1994) (canvassing states' traditional conflict of laws rules re-
garding marriage laws and marriage recognition); Steven K. Homer, Note, Against
Marriage, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505 (1994) (comparing traditional marriage and
same-sex relationships in the context of legal discrimination); Jeffrey J. Swart, Com-
ment, The Wedding Luau-Who is Invited?: Hawaii, Same-Sex Marriage, and Emnerg-
ing Realities, 43 Emory L.J. 1577 (1994) (analyzing greater governmental tolerance of
same-sex units); Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple,
12 Cardozo L. Rev. 681 (1990) (arguing that legalization of same-sex marriage is con-
sistent with the American family).
16. I address the nature of past and current spousal economic relationships (and
argue that Congress should adopt a marriage model that imposes financial burdens on
spouses if marital status is recognized in bankruptcy cases) in a related article. See A.
Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor, and (oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forced to
Pay Each Other's Debts (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
17. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 430 ("By marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything
18. In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), the Supreme Court described mar-
riage as a "contract" that cannot be changed by the contracting parties because the
State holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. Id. at 211. The Court then
referred to marriage as "an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, with-
out which there would be neither civilization nor progress." Id.
19. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 11-12 (1993)
[hereinafter Regan, Family Law]; Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 4
(1985) [hereinafter Weitzman, Revolution].
20. For example, neither party could be married to two people at the same time,
or enter into a contract that was inconsistent with their marital vows, a requirement
that continues today. See John De Witt Gregory et al., Understanding Family Law
§ 4.03, at 84-85 (1993); see also Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status
Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. L. 2127, 2182-83
(1994) [hereinafter Siegel, Modernization] (noting that the basic terms of a marriage
were fixed by law and could not be altered by the parties).
21. 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States
§ 2.1, at 75 (2d ed. 1987).
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matters, the private and public interests22 of the individual spouses
were subordinated to the State's interest in preserving the marital
unit.z3
When marriage was a status, men and women had clearly defined
roles as husbands and wives. Once "merged," the wife became her
husband's property24 and all her personal rights were controlled by
the merged unit (i.e., her husband).2 5 A husband was given the sole
right to control all marital assets, including property his wife owned
before marriage or property held as tenants by the entirety.26 While
entirety property could not be immediately seized by a spouse's sepa-
rate creditors and sold to satisfy a separate debt, in some cases credi-
tors were allowed to reach a spouse's survivorship interest in entirety
property. 7 Thus, all marital assets potentially could be used to pay
either the couple's debts or the husband's separate debts.
22. Many family law feminist scholars argue that it is not possible to separate pub-
lic, market interests from private, family ones. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other TWentieth Century Tragedies 186-88
(1995) (noting that a family's right to "privacy" was often used to cloak violence
against women and children even when the wife sought protection from the State);
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J.
2227, 2281 (1994) (arguing that "the boundaries between the market and the family
are porous"). But cf Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 158-59 (advocating the
consideration of a new model of "status" in family law, but conceding that women in
general, and wives specifically, may be devalued if the law is designed to make
changes in the "public" world of work, but not in the "private" world of the family).
23. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210-11; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2132;
see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion of Equality 19 (1991) (comparing
historical and modern views of marriage); Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 10
(noting that nineteenth century judges and scholars explicitly recognized marriage as
a status rather than merely as a contract); Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State:
The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 Va. L. Rev. 663, 669-70 (1976) [hereinafter Glen-
don, Marriage and the State] (discussing laws that have restricted marriage by impos-
ing age and consent restrictions and waiting period requirements).
24. See Weitzman, Revolution, supra note 19, at 3 ("Upon marriage the wife be-
came a femme covert [sic], a legal nonperson, living under her husband's arm, protec-
tion, and cover.") (citation omitted); Blanche Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L.
Rev. 28, 29 (1935) ("The financial plan of marriage law was founded upon the eco-
nomic relationship of owner and property.").
25. For example, a wife assumed her husband's surname and could not engage in
legal actions unless they were brought in her husband's name. See Lenore J. Weitz-
man, The Marriage Contract 5, 9-12 (1981) [hereinafter Weitzman, Contract] (discuss-
ing wives' loss of independent identity); Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note
23, at 702 (observing that many "believe that a woman's name changes upon marriage
as a matter of law").
26. See John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the
Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1033,
1045 (1972). Before the nineteenth century, the doctrine of coverture deprived wives
of the right to control their property and gave that right to their husbands. See Joan C.
Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 383, 385 (1994)
("Married women 'covered' by their husbands lost control over property brought into
the marriage .... ").
27. Although some individual creditors could levy upon the entirety property to
reach both the debtor spouse's present and survivorship interest in the property, the
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Because husbands had the right to exercise absolute control over
their wives' person and property, the common law imposed a duty on
them to financially support their wives.2 Husbands were generally
given wide latitude in deciding the parameters of this duty, however,
as states routinely refused to set a minimum level of required financial
support.2 9 If, however, a wife purchased basic goods or services from
a third-party creditor, the law made the husband liable (under the
doctrine of necessaries) to pay the creditor for those goods or serv-
ices.3" While creditors could generally force husbands to pay for their
wives' basic living expenses, courts would not force husbands to pay
for unnecessary items31 or items within the wife's means to repay.32
creditor's interest was always subject to the non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship.
See Caryl A. Yzenbaard, Ohio's Beleaguered Entirety Statute, 49 U. Cin. L Rev. 99,
102 (1980). Because the creditor would be a co-tenant with the non-debtor spouse, it
could not partition the property to sell it immediately to satisfy the debt. See id. at
102-03. With the right only to reach the debtor spouse's survivorship interest, a credi-
tor could satisfy the debt only if the debtor spouse survived the non-debtor spouse.
See id. at 102.
28. See Crozier, supra note 24, at 28 ("[The duty] is so familiar that we generally
overlook its peculiar nature. Upon even the briefest analysis it is clear that this is a
rule quite different from any which would be applied in other departments of life
29. See id. at 33. Crozier noted that:
[The] right of support is not a right to any definite thing or any definite
amount even in proportion to the husband's means.... [T]he chances-
which have nothing to do with legal rights-may be either that she will with
difficulty get an inadequate subsistence or that she will live in idleness and
luxury. This is precisely the situation in which property finds itself; it may be
overworked and underfed, or it may be petted and fed with cream, and that
is a matter for the owner to decide.
IL; see also Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and
Family in the United States and Western Europe 115 (1989) [hereinafter Glendon,
Transformation] (noting judicial noninterference in disputes involving spouses' finan-
cial support obligations); Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 40-42 (citing cases
dealing with the nature and sufficiency of a husband's support during marriage).
30. See Richland Mem'l Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E.2d 12 (S.C. 1984). Many state
courts subsequently abolished the doctrine, finding that it constituted unconstitutional
gender-based discrimination. See, e.g., Emanuel v. McGriff, 596 So. 2d 578, 580 (Ala.
1992) (holding that the doctrine of necessaries is unconstitutional); Condore v. Prince
George's County, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (Md. 1981) (holding that neither husband nor
wife is liable without a contract for the necessaries supplied to the other); North Ot-
towa Community Hosp. v. Kieft, 578 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. 1998) (finding that the com-
mon law doctrine of necessaries is unconstitutional); Govan v. Medical Credit Servs.,
Inc., 621 So. 2d 928, 931 (Miss. 1993) (holding one spouse not liable for debts for
another without express consent); Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 303
S.E.2d 905, 908 (Va. 1983) (holding that the necessaries doctrine creates a gender-
based classification not substantially related to serving important government inter-
ests and is therefore unconstitutional).
31. The scope of what was "necessary" was dependent on the husband's financial
status. See Karol Williams, Comment, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary
Application As A Support Remedy, 19 Stetson L Rev. 661, 664 (1990).
32. Creditors had the burden of proving that the item was necessary, that the hus-
band had not already provided the item, and that the wife lacked independent means
of paying for it. See Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So. 2d 199, 204
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Just as husbands had roles to play, wives historically had gender-
specific roles. Throughout much of this century, with the possible ex-
ception of war periods, 33 wives were expected34 to stay home 35 and be
housewives and mothers. 6 In part because of this forced role as
caregiver in the home, wives were deemed to be intellectually incapa-
ble of managing any matter outside the home 7.3  A wife could not own
property separately, 38 enter into contracts,39 execute any legal docu-
ment,4 ° sue or be sued,4 ' or have a domicile separate from her hus-
(Fla. 1988); Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219, 222-23 (Wis. 1980).
While creditors theoretically had an incentive to give a married woman necessary
goods and services, in practice few creditors did so because of the uncertainty that
courts actually would force husbands to reimburse them. See Note, The Unnecessary
Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1767, 1774 (1984).
33. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1223 n.152 (1989) (citing Alice Kessler-Harris,
Women Have Always Worked: A Historical Overview 141-43 (1981)); Phyllis T.
Bookspan, A Delicate Imbalance-Family and Work, 5 Tex. J. Women & L. 37, 45 n.45
(1995) (observing that women's participation in the workforce after Pearl Harbor rose
460%); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of
Wage Labor, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1160-66 (1991).
34. It is doubtful that black wives were "expected" to remain home and be taken
care of financially by their husbands. African-American wives and mothers have con-
sistently worked outside the home in numbers that vastly outnumber those of white
women. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 201 (stating that "the stay-at-home
housewife so taken for granted in the legal model is an ideal that poor black families
cannot afford"); Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege, and Dependency in the
Search for Theory, 82 Geo. L.J. 2481, 2486-90 (1994). Recent statistical studies sug-
gest that most black mothers are not currently married, and it is unclear whether they
cohabit with the fathers of their children. See Jane Mauldon, Family Change and Wel-
fare Reform, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 325, 331-33 (1996).
35. In pre-industrial agrarian marriages, wives worked on the family farm super-
vised by their husbands. See generally Glendon, Transformation, supra note 29, at 111
(noting that in a large group of marriages, specifically those where women had no
independent means and did not work outside the home, turn-of-the-century economic
reforms were irrelevant); Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 169 (stating that
"most women were engaged in domestic employment or agricultural work"); Glen-
don, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 707-08 (noting that a woman's role
included care of a household and children as well as duties in the agricultural produc-
tion unit).
36. See Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 28 (discussing the Victorian role
expectations of spouses); Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 60-64 (discussing the
wife's traditional domestic responsibilities).
37. See Johnston, supra note 26, at 1084. Although wives were expected to care
for the children in the home, fathers had the right to ownership and control over the
children and, as a result, until the early part of the twentieth-century mothers rou-
tinely were denied custody of their children at divorce. See Linda D. Elrod, Child
Custody Practice & Procedure § 1:05 (1996); Fineman, supra note 22, at 76.
38. See Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2127; Williams, supra note 26, at
385.
39. See Blackstone, supra note 17, at 145; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at
2127.
40. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Con-
cerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 Yale L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994) [herein-
after Siegel, Home as Work]; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2127; Williams,
supra note 26, at 386-87.
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band.42 Indeed, even if she were forced to leave the home to earn
wages to help support her family, the law gave her husband the right
to control (or sue to collect) those wages.a3 States ultimately passed
laws designed to give married women the right to keep their pre-mari-
tal property and their individual wages." At common law, however,
wives were essentially prevented from participating in any financial
activity in or outside the home and were deemed incompetent to par-
ticipate in most activities outside the domestic sphere.45
Finally, because wives were viewed as little more than their hus-
bands' chattel, they had no bodily integrity.46 Specifically, the law as-
41. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 40, at 1082; see also Hendrik Hartog,
Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 80 Geo. U.
95, 101 (1991) (stating that, even in equity, a wife could not sue under her own name).
42. See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1906) (discussing a wife's
duty to remain at the matrimonial domicile); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400
(5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that a wife's domicile is deemed to be that of her hus-
band, but refusing to expand that concept when the wife is married to a citizen of a
foreign country); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Juris-
diction, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 813, 844 (discussing domicile in divorce litigation).
43. While many states adopted "earnings statutes" in the 1860's that were
designed to give wives the right to their wages, wives in Georgia were not entitled to
own their wages until 1943. See Johnston, supra note 26, at 1070; see also Siegel, Home
as Work, supra note 40, at 1076-90, 1117 (discussing a wife's lack of property rights to
her wages); Williams, supra note 26, at 386-87, 389 (discussing how a wife's wages and
services belonged to her husband).
44. See 7 Richard R. Powell et al., Powell on Real Property 1 622[31 (1998); John-
ston, supra note 26, at 1061-70; see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 13 § 311 (1989) (stating
how a wife may keep her own earnings as a result of the Married Women's Act of
1869); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 65/7 (West 1993) (stating that a wife may own real
and personal property in her own right); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-7-2 (Michie 1997)(stating that married women have the same property rights as unmarried women);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 460:1 (1992) (stating that property acquired at any time by a
woman shall be free from interference or control by her husband); N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Law § 50 (McKinney 1998) (stating that real or personal property owned by a married
woman shall be sole and separate property); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-1 (1991) (stating
that real and personal property of any married person acquired before or during mar-
riage shall remain the sole and separate property of such married persons); S.C. Code
Ann. § 20-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that a married woman has the power to
convey her separate property to the same extent as if she were unmarried); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-3-504 (1996) (stating that marriage shall not impose any disability on
a woman as to ownership or disposition of any property); Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4(1995) (stating that a wife has the same rights to property as an unmarried woman);
Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Geo. L.J. 1359,
1410 (1983). But see Crozier, supra note 24, at 35-41 (noting that early interpretations
of the Married Women's Property Act still deemed a wife's wages to be owned by her
husband). Allowing wives to hold separate properties primarily benefited the rich,
who were able to bequeath property to their daughters without having the property
automatically transferred to their sons-in-law. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note
40, at 1202; Siegel, Modernization, supra note 20, at 2135.
45. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that women are "unfit" for many occupations in the market because the -domestic
sphere" was the "domain and function[ I of womanhood").
46. At common law, husbands could moderately "chastise" their wives by using a
stick no bigger than their thumbs. See Blackstone, supra note 17, at 432-33.
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sumed that sex-on-demand was an irrevocable term in the marriage
contract and thus, a husband could not "rape" his wife.47 Indeed, at
common law, only rarely could the State successfully convict a hus-
band who helped another man rape his wife or who forced his wife to
have sex with another man.48 Moreover, if a wife were assaulted by
her husband (or at the direction of her husband), she could not pursue
a civil action against him for assault because her husband controlled
her right to file all legal actions and, consequently, he would be both
the plaintiff and the defendant in the assault litigation.49 Similarly,
even if she sued her husband, she would not be entitled to keep any
monetary damages, because her husband owned her property.5"
Things (happily) have changed since the common law. Modern
courts and legislators have overwhelmingly rejected the view that
spouses' preferences and desires about the marital relationship are ir-
relevant and that marriage is a status with state-imposed terms 5
designed to promote the stability and welfare of society.5 2 For exam-
ple, men no longer have the legal right to exercise complete and unfet-
47. See 1 Sir Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 628-29 (1847); Lisa
R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Recon-
ceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 677, 680 (1996); Jaye Sitton, Comment,
Old Wine in New Bottles: The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 261, 265
(1993).
48. See Rene I. Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. Fain. L.
559, 562-63 (1990-91). For a general discussion of marital rape statutory exemptions,
including attempts to extend the exemption to non-married cohabiting males, see Es-
kow, supra note 47, at 681-83.
49. See William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1033 (1930).
50. Jack L. Herskowitz, Comment, Tort Liability Between Husband And Wife:
The Interspousal Immunity Doctrine, 21 U. Miami L. Rev. 423, 427 n.29 (1966) (citing
Austin v. Austin, 100 So. 591, 592 (Miss. 1924)). Likewise, even when wives had the
right to prosecute their husbands for assault, courts generally would not interfere in
family disputes unless the wife was severely injured because each family (i.e., the hus-
band) had the right to determine the domestic governance in its household. See gener-
ally Carl E. Schneider, Moral Disclosure and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1836 (1985) (discussing nineteenth century judicial views
concerning noninterference in the family). Not surprisingly, the traditional plighting
of troth in marriage ceremonies required women to pledge to "love, honor and obey"
their husbands, while men were required to "love, honor and keep" their wives. See
To Love, Honor-And Obey?, Time, July 21, 1986, at 45 (emphasis added).
51. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 Geo. L.J. 2303, 2313 (1994) [hereinafter Regan, Spouses and
Strangers]; Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits
of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2423, 2424-25 (1994). See gen-
erally Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for
State Policy, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 207 (1982) (arguing that spouses should have access,
during marriage, to legal dispute resolution of privately contracted marital
obligations).
52. See Glendon, Transformation, supra note 29, at 291-93 (discussing the transfor-
mation of marital status views); Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 89-117 (describ-
ing evolution from status to contract as legal basis of family relationships); see also
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 Utah L.
Rev. 687 (positing that "relationships are voluntary and contractual").
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tered domination and control over all aspects of their wives's lives
3
and wives are no longer deemed legal non-entities. Although states
currently give spouses greater leeway in deciding how to govern and
terminate their marriages, states still exercise complete control over
how marriages are created54 and continue to view marriage as a mat-
ter of "public concern."55 Likewise, although states no longer assume
that wives are incapable of handling any financial aspects of their
lives, and thus, need to be controlled by their husbands, states con-
tinue to believe that married couples assume at least some minimal
commitment of mutual support upon marriage.-6
While acknowledging that society continues to favor the institution
of marriage, some family law scholars have observed that modem
marriages should be viewed more accurately as partnerships of auton-
omous persons formed to promote the happiness of the two individu-
als and that the operation of the partnership should be largely free
from external regulations.5 7 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
53. Although modem assault and battery statutes make prosecutions theoretically
possible, law enforcement and social services agencies may not treat intra-family as-
saults as seriously as stranger assaults. See John Marzulli, Home Violence Swells: Rise
in Homicide, Rape & Assault-NYPD, N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 30, 1997, at 10 (noting
criticism that police did not take domestic violence seriously); see also Rhonda L
Kohler, Comment, The Battered Women and Tort Law. A New Approach to Fighting
Domestic Wolence, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1025, 1029-30 (1992) (noting criticism of
"traditional tort law for not taking into account the experiences of women in battering
relationships").
The Southern Baptist Convention recently added an article to the Baptist Faith and
Message that both defines marriage in heterosexual terms and requires a wife -to
submit graciously to the servant leadership of her husband." Mary Rourke, A Wo-
man's Place: What the Denominations Think, L.A. Times, June 16, 1998, at E2. Thus,
at least some members of society continue to prefer the common law view of female
subservience.
54. See Baehr v. Lein, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (discussing the state's control
over who can legally marry); see also supra note 1 (citing examples of statutes that
define and regulate marriage).
55. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Chandler
v. Central Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 649, 653 (Kan. 1993) (noting that annulments are disfa-
vored because "the marriage relationship is a matter of public concern"): Simeone v.
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 168 (Pa. 1990) (McDermott, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
the majority's characterization of marriage in contractual terms and rejecting the view
that marriage is a "mere contract for hire").
56. See Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18 (quoting See v. See, 415 P.2d 776, 780 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1966)); see also Cal. Fam. Code § 4300 (West 1994) (requiring spouses to
support each other); id. § 720 (requiring that husbands and wives pledge to one an-
other mutual respect, fidelity, and support); id. §§ 1620, 3580 (prohibiting husbands
and wives generally from altering their legal relationship toward each other); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 123.090 (Michie 1993) (entitling creditors to separate property of non-
debtor spouse to satisfy necessaries of debtor spouse); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 4.02
(West 1993) (obligating each spouse to support the other).
57. See Schultz, supra note 51, at 251. See generally Fineman, supra note 23, at 18-
19 (noting that earlier views of marriage protected the private unity of a husband and
wife from state intrusion or regulation, but suggesting that marriage currently exists as
an institution primarily to promote the happiness of a couple).
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Act 58 somewhat synthesizes this status-less view of marriage by defin-
ing marriage as a "personal relationship between a man and a woman
[that arises from] a civil contract to which the consent of the parties is
essential."59 Certain political, economic, and legal developments cre-
ated the impetus for viewing marriage less as a merger and more as a
partnership. These developments include: the development of an in-
dustrial (rather than agrarian) workforce;61 the increase in the number
of women wage-earners;61 society's increased demand to protect and
promote individual liberty;62 a reduction in gender bias in marriage
laws;63 society's changing moral beliefs;' and the changing economic
relationships between spouses.65
The biggest push to view marriage as a partnership occurred after
scholars and lawyers representing "homemaker" wives saw these stay-
58. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is recognized in the following states:
Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washing-
ton. See Marti E. Thurman, Note, Maintenance: A Recognition of the Need for Guide-
lines, 33 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 971, 974 n.21 (1994-95).
59. Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 201 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 175 (1998).
60. See Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 40, at 1092. As husbands increasingly
left the family farm to work in an industrial workplace, wives became even more
dependent on their husbands for cash. To combat the prevailing view that husbands
left the home to "work" while wives stayed at home and did nothing socially produc-
tive, antebellum women's rights advocates argued that household labor should also be
viewed as "work." See id. at 1092-94.
61. Compare Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 3 (predicting that as more
married women enter full-time work, for more pay and at higher occupational levels,
their roles, power, and authority within family will continue to change), with Borelli,
16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Pochd, J., dissenting) (commenting that "[t]he assumption that
only the rare wife can make a financial contribution to her family has become badly
outdated in this age in which many married women have paying employment outside
the home [and a] two-income family can no longer be dismissed as a statistically insig-
nificant aberration").
62. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977)
(holding a zoning ordinance unconstitutional because of its arbitrary definition of
"family"); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973) (finding a due process violation
when state law irrebuttably presumes that an in-state student with a non-resident
spouse is a non-resident); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (stating that
dissimilar treatment of married and unmarried people in the distribution of contra-
ceptives violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Robin-
son v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that due process is violated when a
state statute criminalizes status of narcotic addiction without proof that the accused
used narcotics in the jurisdiction).
63. See Crozier, supra note 24, at 28 (comparing the economic relationship be-
tween spouses in traditional marriages to that "between master and slave ... between
a person and his domesticated animal"). Once slavery was abolished, it increasingly
became difficult to treat wives as their husbands' property. See Siegel, Modernization,
supra note 20, at 2201. But cf John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in Essays
on Sex Equality 123, 217 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970) (observing that "marriage is the
only actual bondage known to our law" and "there remain no legal slaves, except the
mistress of every house").
64. See Schneider, supra note 50, at 1842-45 (discussing the waning influence of
Christianity in some groups).
65. See Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 698 (discussing factors
that led to the diminution of the legal effects of formal marriage).
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at-home spouses harmed economically by no-fault divorce laws. To
counter the treatment homemaker spouses increasingly received at di-
vorce, wives' advocates argued that spouses should be viewed as eco-
nomic partners because work both in the home and in the market
benefits the joint financial endeavor (i.e., the marriage).' These ad-
vocates argued that if the parties agreed (either implicitly or explic-
itly) that the wife would stay home to rear children and care for the
family, then the stay-at-home spouse would be entitled to equal finan-
cial treatment at divorce because her household labor is as an asset
that contributed to the financial success of the marriageY By charac-
terizing marriage as a "partnership," wives encouraged courts to ana-
lyze the marital relationship using contract terminology.
Because common law marriages were regulated by both the State
and the Church, courts historically refused to view marriage as a mere
contract.68 In addition, because the wife's existence merged into her
husband's at common law, spouses historically could not enter into
contracts with each other: such a contract would be deemed to be
between the husband (as a legally competent contracting party) and
the husband (as the legal representative of his legally incompetent
wife).6 9 Moreover, because the state dictated all terms of the marital
relationship, courts routinely found that inter-spousal contracts either
were void for lack of consideration (because the wife was legally obli-
gated to perform domestic services) or were unenforceable on public
policy grounds (because the husband had a duty to support his %vife).70
66. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 66-67; Regan, Spouses and Stran-
gers, supra note 51, at 2316.
67. See Regan, supra note 51, at 2316; see also Barry A. Schatz & Jacalyn Birn-
baum, New Statute Promotes Homnemakers' Rights, 80 I11. BJ. 610, 616 (1992) (report-
ing that Illinois recognizes the value of a homemaker's contribution to marital estate
and noting that the contribution may require a lengthy absence from the work force);
Mark A. Sessums, What Are Wives' Contributions Worth Upon Divorce?: Toward
Fully Incorporating Partnership Into Equitable Distribution, 41 Fla. L Rev. 987 (1989)
(arguing for a rebuttable presumption of "equal" distribution of property at divorce
to avoid discounting wives' contributions outside the market, especially when the par-
ties have agreed to such an arrangement); John R. Dowd, Note, Defining the Doctrine
of Equitable Distribution in Mississippi: A Rebuttable Presumption That Homemak-
ing Services Are as Valuable to the Acquisition of Marital Property as Breadwinning
Services, 16 Miss. C. L. Rev. 479, 486-87 (1996) (noting state court's recognition that
homemaker services significantly contribute to a marital estate and that rendering
those services may have caused a homemaker to sacrifice hislher owvn career).
68. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Honentaker: A Discourse on
Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 67, 116 (1993).
69. See Blackstone, supra note 17, at 430; see also Hartog, supra note 41, at 101
(noting a spouse's inability to enter into a separation agreement).
70. See Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697, 698 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968) ("[A]
contract between husband and wife whereby one spouse agrees to perform specified
obligations imposed by law as a part of the marital duties of the spouses to each other
is without consideration, and is void as against public policy."); see also Weitzman,
supra note 25, at 338 (noting historical restrictions on contracts between husbands and
wives).
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Even after wives were given the legal right to enter into contracts in
their own names, judges were reluctant to enforce any market-based
contract that released a husband from providing economic support to
his wife or that obligated the husband to pay his wife for performing
domestic services7" because of the courts' concern that recognizing
such contracts would encourage married couples to act strategically
(rather than altruistically) in their marriages to protect themselves fi-
nancially in the event of divorce. Similarly, courts felt that encourag-
ing spouses to contractually define their duties to each other during
the marriage would promote an alienated, cynical view of marriage
that desecrates the institution and debases its intimate nature.72 In
addition to questioning the incentives created by such contracts,
courts felt institutionally incompetent to handle a contract that regu-
lated marital minutiae such as who takes out the trash, who changes
the baby's diapers, and how often couples have sex.73 Finally, judges
were concerned that recognizing inter-spousal contracts would result
in married couples flooding the courts with requests for judicial inter-
vention in private marital affairs.74
71. While modem courts will enforce most premarital agreements, most will still
not enforce inter-spousal contracts that obligate the husband to pay the wife for per-
forming acts traditionally performed by wives, including performing domestic house-
hold labor. See Finch v. Finch, 592 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that
a wife cannot be compensated for leaving her job to care for her sick husband upon
divorce); Ritchie v. White, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416-17 (N.C. 1945) (finding a contract be-
tween husband and wife for services rendered by wife to her late husband unenforce-
able because it related to domestic obligations incident to marriage); Oates v. Oates,
33 S.E.2d 457, 460 (W. Va. 1945) (holding that a wife's agreement to perform domes-
tic duties for compensation was contrary to public policy and lacked consideration);
cf Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1993) (noting that "a spouse
is not entitled to compensation for support apart from rights to community property
and the like that arises from the marital relation itself"); see also Schultz, supra note
51 (noting cases dealing with the marital contract or relation). See generally Siegel,
Modernization, supra note 20, at 2182, 2204 ("Without exception, courts ruled inter-
spousal contracts regarding wives' domestic labor unenforceable.").
72. See generally Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (Md. 1985) (holding that a
medical degree and license were not encompassed within the legislatively intended
definition of marital property); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982) (hold-
ing that where a spouse receives from his or her partner financial contributions used
in obtaining a professional degree with expectation of deriving material benefits for
both marriage partners, such spouse may have to reimburse the supporting spouse);
Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (noting the majority
view that "a wife who contributes to her husband's professional education may not,
upon divorce, receive an award for her contributions"); Starnes, supra note 68, at 116
n.221 (citing a Supreme Court case holding that marriage is more than a mere con-
tract). But see Borelli, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21-22 (Poch6, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
view that enforcing an interspousal contract would degrade the spouse providing the
service and reduce that spouse to no better than a hired servant).
73. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 709 ("Con-
tracts which purport to regulate who washes the dishes and takes out the garbage are
no more enforceable than the famous 'invitation to dinner."').
74. Starnes, supra note 68, at 116.
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Despite courts' initial unwillingness to enforce any marital contract,
and their continued reluctance to recognize contracts that govern the
operation of an existing marriage, couples have increasingly turned to
the law to give certainty to their legal and economic obligations to
each other in the event of divorce. As a result, more couples are rely-
ing on prenuptial agreements and other premarital financial plan-
ning. 5 Indeed, given the increased use of these contracts by some
types of prospective spouses,76 modern marriage in many ways looks
like an arms-length contractual agreement." While courts tradition-
ally resisted attempts to enforce marital contracts, given the increased
use of premarital agreements and the rise in divorces, courts now rou-
tinely recognize the validity of these agreements.78
75. Drafting a prenuptial or antenuptial contract requires the assistance of an at-
torney. The estimated cost of a prenuptial agreement ranges from $1,500 to $3,000 in
routine cases to potentially six figures in complicated cases. See Burton Young &
Mitchell K. Karpf, In Addition to Safeguarding Inheritances, Prenuptial Contracts Can
Help Attorneys Protect Their Finn Ownership Interests, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 15, 1997, at B7
(observing that complex agreements conceivably could cost as much as S100,000).
Given this, only prospective spouses with significant assets to protect and who can
afford to hire a lawyer to protect those assets will use premarital contracts. See Gary
Belsky, The Best Money Moves for Every Season of Your Life, Money, Aug. 1997, at
116, 117. See generally Eric Schmuckler, Breaking Up Is Complex To Do, Forbes, Oct.
24, 1988, at 360, 360 (discussing the complexities of divorce among the wealthy with-
out a prenuptial agreement). Currently, an estimated five percent of the 2.4 million
couples who marry each year sign prenuptial agreements. See Belsky, supra, at 117.
76. Prospective spouses most likely to use (or be told to use) pre-marital agree-
ments include those who (1) have children from previous relationships, (2) own a
business, (3) earn significantly more than the other spouse, or (4) have considerable
assets. See Belsky, supra note 75, at 117; see also David L. Chambers, What 117 The
Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male
Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 479 (1996) (discussing the availability of contractual
agreements among married couples that provide for a different division of assets upon
divorce or death than the law would normally allow); Richard A. Epstein, A Last
Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. Miami L. Rev 253, 271 (1986) ("Today of course
marriages are much less status and more contractual, and it is not surprising that ante-
nuptial agreements have a far wider scope to play, especially in second marriages
when either or both partners have substantial assets and children by previous mar-
riage."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76
Va. L. Rev. 9, 79 n.174 (1990) (discussing two situations in which prenuptial agree-
ments are typically used); Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts:
The Promise of Avitzur, 73 Geo. LJ. 193, 222 (1984) ("Antenuptial agreements most
commonly are associated with the very wealthy, or with older people who want to
preserve their estates for children of a previous marriage.").
77. See Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. Mich. J.L Re-
form 217,255 (1990) (observing that marriage has become a less public, more private,
institution that can better accommodate broad variations in spousal behavior and
preferences).
78. See Scott, supra note 52, at 703 (noting courts' willingness to enforce marital
contracts); Brigid McMenamin, 'Til Divorce Do Us Part, Forbes, Oct. 14, 1996, at 52,
53 (commenting that if done right, prenuptial agreements are -bullet proof"). Section
306 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that courts should enforce
written separation agreements unless the agreement is unconscionable. See Unif.
Marriage and Divorce Act § 306,9 U.L.A. 249 (1998). A number of states have either
adopted U.M.D.A. section 306 or have concluded that written agreements should
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
II. LEGAL TREATMENT OF UNMARRIED COHABITING COUPLES
States promote marriage primarily to provide a stable environment
for rearing children and to prevent divorced wives from becoming
public wards. To encourage marriage and discourage couples from co-
habiting, states historically refused to give unmarried couples any
legal rights or benefits because of their view that non-marital sexual
relationships were morally offensive and because of their concern that
acknowledging these relationships would undermine and debase the
institution of marriage.79 To discourage these relationships, courts re-
fused to enforce contracts between unmarried couples if the contract
was designed to regulate marriage-like activities or could be construed
as being based on illicit sexual activities."0 In addition to concluding
that unmarried unions were immoral and threatened the economic
stability provided by marriage, some states also felt that there was no
compelling justification to protect the rights of unmarried couples be-
cause unmarried cohabiting couples could protect their legal rights by
marrying each other.8' Finally, courts and states resisted granting
generally be enforceable unless the agreement is deemed to be unconscionable. See,
e.g., Idaho Code § 32-925(1)(b) (1997) (stating that separation agreements are not
enforceable if they are unconscionable); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.180 (Michie 1996)
("If the court finds the separation agreement unconscionable, it may request the par-
ties to submit a revised separation agreement or may make orders for the disposition
of property, support, and maintenance."); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-6081(b) (1997)
(stating that a premarital agreement is not enforceable if it was unconscionable when
executed); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-7(a)(2) (1996) (stating that a premarital agreement
is not enforceable if it was unconscionable when executed); In re Marriage of Manzo,
659 P.2d 669, 671 (Colo. 1983) (noting that an agreement is subject to review by the
district court for unconscionability); Simmons v. Simmons, 396 N.E.2d 631, 633 (11U.
1979) (stating that an agreement may not be so unjust as to be unconscionable); Voigt
v. Voigt, 670 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ind. 1996) (holding that courts should exercise great
restraint when determining the enforceability of a settlement agreement); Ferry v.
Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that a court is bound to
uphold an agreement unless unconscionable); Weber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781, 783
(N.D. 1996) ("Property settlement agreements in divorce cases must be scrutinized
for unconscionability."); Penhallow v. Penhallow, 649 A.2d 1016, 1021 (R.I. 1994) (re-
quiring proof of involuntary execution and nondisclosure or waivers in addition to
unconscionability for an agreement to be set aside by the court).
79. See Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements:
Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 163, 167 (1985) (stating that some
courts have maintained that cohabitation agreements involve immoral consideration
and are therefore unenforceable); Schneider, supra note 50, at 1815.
80. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 386. In the highly celebrated
palimony dispute involving the actor Lee Marvin, the court indicated that it would
enforce an agreement between unmarried cohabitants unless it appeared that the
agreement rests upon a consideration of sexual services. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106, 112-13 (Cal. 1976); J. Thomas Oldham & David S. Caudhill, A Reconnais-
sance of Public Policy Restrictions Upon Enforcement of Contracts Between Cohabi-
tants, 18 Fain. L.Q. 93, 97 (1984).
81. See generally Oldham & Caudhill, supra note 80, at 106 ("It was traditionally
assumed that if a couple wished to establish a serious commitment to one another,
they would marry or at least hold themselves out as husband and wife."). Of course,
this applied only to unmarried straight cohabitants. Gay cohabitants could not pro-
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benefits associated with marriage (like inheritance or divorce rights)
to unmarried cohabitants or those in common law marriages8 because
of the difficulty of proving whether those cohabitants had legally es-
tablished their entitlement to those marital benefits.8a
Just as courts' views of the legal relationship between married
couples have changed, courts have been increasingly willing to grant
legal rights to unmarried couples. Informal marriages' (including
those that produce children)' and other types of non-traditional fam-
ily arrangements are becoming much more common in American soci-
ety.86 Indeed, the United States Census Bureau has recognized this
societal change and has created separate categories for some of these
arrangements.87 As these informal marriages become more common,
tect themselves by marrying since gay marriages have never been, and are not now,
legally valid anywhere in this country.
82. Common law marriages are recognized in the following twelve jurisdictions:
Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A
Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 Or. L Rev. 709,715 n.24
(1996). States that recognize common law marriages generally define them as any
informal marriage between heterosexuals that does not meet the formal statutory re-
quirements for marriage. See Gregory et. al., supra note 20, at 27. States generally
will find that a couple is in a common law marriage if the cohabiting couple agrees
and has the present intent to enter into a matrimonial relationship and holds them-
selves out to the community as husband and wife. See id. at 27-28; Ellen Kandoian,
Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75
Geo LJ. 1829, 1842, 1850 (1987).
83. See Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (N.Y. 1980) (noting that
while common-law marriage works "substantial justice" in some cases, the doctrine
was not desirable because there was no built-in method to distinguish valid from inva-
lid claims); see also Kandoian, supra note 82, at 1851-52 (observing that common law
marriages encourage fraud because a lack of public records makes it difficult to verify
that the "marriage" actually exists); Prince, supra note 79, at 197 (discussing cohabita-
tion agreements). But see Kathryn S. Vaughn, Comment, The Recent Changes to the
Texas Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Mar-
riage?, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 1131, 1137 (1991) (arguing that the dangers of fraud are no
greater in a common law marriage than in any other arrangement that potentially
offers a large reward).
84. By "informal" marriages, I mean any intimate relationship that is not officially
recognized by the State. Included within this term would be common law marriages,
gay marriages, and any other long-standing relationship between unmarried persons
who are not legally married.
85. See Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 124; Kandoian, supra note 82, at
1865 (discussing an increase in children living in households of cohabiting couples);
Mauldon, supra note 34, at 330-33 (noting uncertainty as to number of black mothers
who cohabit with their children's father).
86. See supra note 14; see also Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmar-
ried Heterosexual and Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family," 29
J. Fain. L. 497, 500 (1990-91) (discussing the rise in "alternative" family arrangements,
including unmarried gay and straight couples and single parent households). See gen-
erally Oldham & Caudhill, supra note 80, at 112 n.89 (discussing studies that indicate
that premarital cohabitation may be a "permanent social phenomenon" in the United
States).
87. One such category is POSSLQ, Persons of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living
Quarters. See Statistical Abstract, supra note 14, at 44. One federal court even has
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they also become more accepted because, even if the arrangement is
not officially condoned or encouraged, states are increasingly willing
to grant legal rights to persons in informal marriages or non-tradi-
tional family arrangements.88
Reasons cited for the increase in non-traditional living arrange-
ments include lower tax benefits for married, low income workers in
comparison to single workers, higher taxes imposed on high income
married couples, the desire to avoid having a divorced parent's new
spouse's income reported on college financial aid applications, and the
concerns older individuals have of losing federal retirement or health
benefits upon marriage. 9 For many, unmarried cohabitation has be-
come an important form of emotional and financial interdependence,
comparable to the relationship associated primarily with "traditional"
marriages. 90 Indeed, among certain groups, informal marriage is the
norm.
For example, informal marriages among gay and lesbian couples is
the only "norm" available to them because they are legally prohibited
cited a humorous poem extolling the joys of "Official POSSLQuity." See Fischer v.
Dallas Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 106 F.R.D. 465, 469 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
Other terms used to describe unmarried cohabitants include CUPOS (Cohabiting Un-
married Persons of Opposite Sex) and PSSSLQ (Persons Of The Same Sex Sharing
Living Quarters). See In re Relationship of Eggers, 638 P.2d 1267, 1270 n.2 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1982) (rejecting POSSLQ in favor of CUPOS); Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning
Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It Property, 17 Women's Rts. L.
Rep. 109, 131 n.214 (1996) (referring to PSSSLQs).
88. For example, courts no longer view the unmarried cohabitation of an ex-
spouse as prima facie grounds for terminating an award of alimony. See Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Me. 1980); Melletz v. Melletz, 638 A.2d 898, 903 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). Likewise, courts no longer terminate parents' custodial
rights simply because a parent cohabits with a non-spouse. See Nolte v. Nolte, 609
N.E.2d 381, 385-86 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1981); Almond v. Almond 257 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). But see
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108-09 (Va. 1995) (awarding custody to maternal
grandmother because mother lived with lesbian lover).
Some courts also have allowed gay persons to adopt children. See In re M.M.D., 662
A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); In re Tammy.
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt.
1993). Others have permitted gay individuals to adopt each other. See In re Swanson,
623 A.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Del. 1993) (allowing the adoption of a gay lover in part to
facilitate estate planning.); 333 East 53rd St. Assocs. v. Mann, 121 A.D.2d 289 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 512 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1987) (permitting adoption of one eld-
erly woman by another for purposes of establishing succession rights to rent-con-
trolled apartment); In re Adult Anonymous II, 88 A.D.2d 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(approving adoption of an adult male by his male lover).
89. See Martin, supra note 86, at 17-18. Other reasons cited for the decline in
marriages include changing attitudes toward marriage caused by low employment
rates for males, high labor force participation for women, and couples' fear that the
marriage will end in divorce. See Mauldon, supra note 34, at 333-36.
90. See generally Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 129 (defining marriage as
"a relationship in which one's sense of self is constituted in part through connection
with another").
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from marrying. In addition, among those in the lower socio-economic
classes, unmarried cohabitation appears to have been common for
some time.91 Likewise, as American life expectancy increases, many
widowed, older Americans increasingly are choosing to live together
to reduce living expenses, but not to marry, if marriage would cause
them to lose retirement or other governmental benefits. 2 Notwith-
standing a change in social attitude and acceptance of these informal
marriages,93 courts still remain somewhat hesitant when asked to en-
force contracts that attempt to impose marriage-like duties on unmar-
ried parties, or to compensate cohabitants for activities traditionally
associated with legal marriages.94
III. BENEFITS AWARDED BASED ON MARITAL STATUS
An examination of the current interpretation and application of
bankruptcy laws reveals a disparity in the way in which married and
unmarried couples are treated. This part scrutinizes non-bankruptcy
benefits awarded on the basis of marital status, as well as bankruptcy
benefits awarded to married and unmarried debtors. Despite their
limited utility to creditors and debtors, status-based considerations
continue to play a significant role in bankruptcy laws.
A. Non-Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of
Marital Status
Notwithstanding the dramatic changes in the nature and perma-
nency95 of spouses' relationships to each other, state and federal laws
91. See Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 193; Stuart J. Stein, Comnon Law
Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems, 9 J. Fain. L 271, 293
(1969); Walter 0. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends
in Family Organization, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 88 (1960).
92. See Lani Luciano, Money Helps: Answers to Your Questions, Money, Sept.
1997, at 181, 182 (reflecting fear that remarrying will jeopardize the receipt of a for-
mer spouse's social security benefits); Melynda Wilcox, Love & Money, Senior Style,
Kiplinger's Pers. Fin., Oct. 1, 1996, at 83, 83 (referencing a study by the American
Association of Retired Persons which notes an increase in midlife and older citizens
cohabiting as unmarried couples because of a fear that they will lose survivor benefits
if they marry); see also Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 365 (suggesting that
cohabitation is the "preferred option for some once-married middle-aged and older
persons" who fear losing survivors' benefits from an earlier marriage).
93. In response to the increasing number of cohabiting, unmarried employees, a
number of municipalities and companies have adopted domestic partner initiatives to
extend some benefits to the partners of their employees. See infra notes 182, 189-96
and accompanying text. The popular media also has discussed the changing nature of,
and the difficulties of addressing, non-traditional families and unmarried cohabitants.
See Letitia Baldridge, Letitia Baldridge's Complete Guide to the New Manners for
the '90s 182-85 (1990) (discussing the legalities of living together, how to address co-
habiting couples, and how to structure cohabiting household); Elizabeth L Post, Em-
ily Post's Etiquette 165-73 (15th ed. 1992) (same).
94. See Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 122-23.
95. See supra note 13.
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continue to provide benefits to protect and promote marriage. States
continue to believe that the rights to property and economic support
that flow from a legal marriage decrease the likelihood that wives and
children will become wards of the state if the parents divorce.9 6 Thus,
encouraging marriage is still believed to be necessary to protect the
state fiscally.97 Because of the view that encouraging marriage ulti-
mately yields economic (and perhaps emotional) gains that exceed the
cost of awarding marriage based benefits, married couples continue to
receive favorable treatment under both federal and state laws.
For example, under federal tax laws, spouses have the right to file a
joint tax return 98 and the ability to reduce certain gift99 and estate
taxes.100 They also have the right to receive certain federal entitle-
ments that are granted based on marital status (including social secur-
ity benefits),101 and they receive favorable privileges in immigration
decisions.102 Spouses have the right under state laws to sue for loss of
consortium and for wrongful death, 0 3 and the right not to be forced
to testify against each other in criminal proceedings.10 4 State laws also
give spouses the right to receive property from each other when one
dies intestate0 5 and in many states, spouses can rely on state laws to
96. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1180 n.78, 1181 n.82; see also Mich.
Comp. Laws. § 551.1 (West 1998) (defining marriage as a unique relationship between
a man and a woman and expressing the state's "special interest in encouraging, sup-
porting, and protecting that unique relationship in order to promote, among other
goals, the stability and welfare of society and its children").
97. See generally Prince, supra note 79 (discussing public policy limitations on co-
habitation agreements).
98. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013 (1994).
99. See id. § 2001(d) (adjustment for gift tax paid by spouse).
100. See id. § 2056(a) (allowance of marital deduction).
101. See, e.g., Federal Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42
U.S.C. § 402(b)-(c) (1994) (providing benefits to homemaker spouse at retirement of
long-employed spouse); id. § 402(e)-(f) (providing benefits to a surviving spouse upon
death of an employee spouse); id. § 416(a) (defining spouse and surviving spouse); id.
§ 416(b) (defining "wife"); id. § 416(c) (defining "widow"); id. § 416(0 (defining
"husband"); id. § 416(g) ("defining widower"); see also id. § 416(h)(1) (establishing
factors to be used for determining family status).
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994) (exempting immigrant spouses of United States
citizens from certain visa restrictions).
103. See Alaska Stat. § 09.55.580 (Michie 1997); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-612(West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-4-2 (Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-107
(1997).
104. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-21-227 (1995) (giving a spouse the option to testify,
but not compelling testimony); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-423 (1994) (same); Md. Code
Ann.. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106 (Supp. 1997) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2162
(Supp. 1998) (same); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (Supp. 1997) (same); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 546.260 (West 1998) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (1986) (same); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 5913 (West Supp. 1998) (same); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060 (West Supp.
1998) (same).
105. Each state has a statutory provision that provides, in substantial part, that a
surviving spouse is entitled to receive a share of the deceased spouse's estate even if
the spouse dies intestate. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 13500 (West 1991) (giving a
spouse the right to property when the other spouse dies intestate); N.Y. Est. Powers
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shield their assets from individual creditors by owning property as ten-
ants by the entirety."0 6 In addition to receiving quantifiable state and
federal benefits, married couples receive certain status-based entitle-
ments, including the right to visit each other in hospitals and in jails."°
Finally, although many unmarried workers have successfully con-
vinced both public and private employers to extend employee benefit
coverage to their non-spouse partners,tm in most instances only mar-
ried employees receive workplace employee benefits for their
dependents. 0 9
B. Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded to Married and
Unmarried Debtors
Although bankruptcy laws are designed to regulate debtors' eco-
nomic affairs with their creditors, and not their sexual affairs with
their significant others, the Code grants several benefits to debtors
based solely on their decision or ability to marry. That bankruptcy
laws give married debtors benefits denied to unmarried debtors is not
surprising, as other federal and state laws discriminate in favor of mar-
ried couples." 0 Likewise, because bankruptcy laws generally reflect
social norms and values,"' it is not surprising that bankruptcy laws
favorably treat people in "traditional" marriages. 12 Although it is
& Trusts § 5-1.1-A (McKinney Supp. 1997) (same); Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 38 (b)
(West 1980 & Supp. 1998) (same); Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-1 (Michie 1995) (same).
106. See infra notes 135-48 and accompanying text.
107. See Abigail Goldman, Gays Rally Support for Right to Marry, LA. Times, Feb.
13, 1998, at B5.
108. For a discussion of domestic partner ordinances and initiatives, see infra notes
189-94 and accompanying text.
109. See e.g., Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1194 n.152 (discussing pro-
posed ruling designed to prevent discrimination on the basis of marital status in the
provision of health insurance benefits); Howard Pianko & Dean L Silverberg, Do-
mestic Partner Benefits On The Rise: What Are The Legal And Tar Issues?, N.Y. Li.,
Nov. 17, 1997, at 53 (recognizing that "[e]mployers are facing increasing pressure to
extend benefits to their employees' domestic partners").
110. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text. See generally Chambers, supra
note 76, at 472-74 (listing burdens and benefits conferred on married but not unmar-
ried couples).
111. Many of the exceptions to discharge found in 11 U.S.C. § 523 can be justified
only on the basis of public policy. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1994 & Supp. II
1996) (excepting alimony and child support); id. § 523(a)(6) (excepting debts for will-
ful and malicious injury); id. §523(a)(8) (excepting student loans); id. § 523(a)(9) (ex-
cepting debts arising out of drunk driving). In addition, in response to a number of
bankruptcy filings by airlines, Congress amended § 365 of the Code to make it more
difficult for airlines to perform under certain airport leases. See id. § 365(d)(5)-(9).
Finally, after one particularly infamous bankruptcy case involving a CEO who admit-
ted he filed a bankruptcy to enhance the company's bargaining power with a union,
Congress amended § 1113 of the Code to require a company to satisfy additional pro-
cedural hurdles before being allowed to reject a collective bargaining agreement. See
id. § 1113.
112. For an early view of traditional marriages, see George F. James, The Income of
Married Couples: Is the Knutson Bill Justice?, Taxes, Apr. 1948. at 311, 366 ("It must
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quite unlikely that any given debtor could take advantage of all mari-
tal benefits in a single case, 1 3 Congress should examine whether
granting status-based benefits is consistent with the goals of a federal
system designed to regulate a debtor's obligations to third-party
creditors."14
The following sections discuss several bankruptcy benefits all mar-
ried debtors receive (even if they are not economically dependent on
each other) but no unmarried couples receive (even if they are eco-
nomically linked). 1 5 It seems clear that Congress does not grant mar-
ital benefits to debtors in order to promote or protect marriage.
Instead, Congress grants most marital bankruptcy benefits for reasons
that have nothing to do with the desire to encourage marriage. As I
detail below, Congress provides some benefits as a matter of adminis-
trative convenience and provides others to ensure that debtors' and
creditors' rights in state-created property interests are the same under
state and federal bankruptcy laws. Indeed, Congress generally recog-
nizes a debtor's marital status simply to avoid the expense and time of
requiring married couples to prove that they are economically linked.
In discussing two benefits made available to both married and unmar-
ried economically linked couples, I conclude this part by arguing that
status-based benefits are not consistent with bankruptcy policy and
goals because they create an over and under-inclusive system.
1. Joint Filing
Section 302 of the Code gives married couples the right to file a
joint bankruptcy petition." 6 Congress awards this right to facilitate
be recognized that the basic American social pattern is still that of married couples
living together, the husband being the principal or sole wage earner, and the wife's
major contribution being the management of the home and the care of children."). It
is doubtful whether the husband-in-marketplace, wife-at-home paradigm actually was
a "tradition" for all groups in society. See Williams, supra note 22, at 2282 n.282 (pos-
iting that the "tradition" encompassed only Protestants); see also supra notes 33-34
(discussing wartime and black wives' nontraditional roles).
113. For example, debtors can shield community property under 11 U.S.C § 524
only in the nine community property states. See Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1760
(1997) (discussing community property states); In re Brollier, 165 B.R. 286, 289 n.4
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994) (listing Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin as community property states).
114. If the debtor owes a former spouse debts incurred during a divorce, bank-
ruptcy policy should consider the debtor's marital relationship because the ex-spouse
would be a creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (stating that debts in the nature of
alimony and child support are non-dischargeable in all bankruptcy cases). But see id.
§ 523(a)(15) (stating that other divorce-related debts may be dischargeable in Chap-
ter 7 liquidation cases).
115. I discuss these benefits in another article and conclude that, if Congress per-
sists in granting benefits based on marital status it should also impose burdens on
spouses (including the duty to help repay debts). See Dickerson, supra note 16.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not provide for joint fil-
ings because married women historically could not incur debt separately or own sepa-
rate property and, thus, there was no need for them to file for bankruptcy protection
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case administration, not to promote marriage or to encourage spouses
to support each other. The scant legislative history of § 302 suggests
that Congress believed that most married couples are jointly liable on
their debts and jointly hold most of their property." 7 Although Con-
gress assumed that most married couples are jointly obligated and
jointly own property, even married couples who have no joint debts or
assets or who live apart are allowed to file a joint petition." 8 Having
assumed that married couples are economically linked, Congress al-
lowed cases to be jointly administered to obviate the need for married
debtors to hire two attorneys and pay two filing fees.
Legal fees and costs involved with bankruptcy filings can be daunt-
ing-especially when one remembers that debtors (by definition) gen-
erally have limited funds. Thus, allowing economically linked married
debtors to save expenses is reasonable." 9 In addition to reducing out-
of-pocket expenses, allowing a married couple to file a joint case
reduces the administrative costs of having two related cases proceed
through the same court at the same time with two separate trustees
potentially evaluating the same debts and assets. Finally, allowing ec-
onomically linked married debtors to file a joint petition potentially
reduces the amount of time each must spend in court (and thus, must
miss from work) since courts can excuse one spouse from fully partici-
pating in the bankruptcy case if the attending spouse can provide all
relevant financial information for the absentee spouse.1 20
But while allowing economically linked married debtors to file a
joint petition makes sense and is administratively efficient, there is no
reason why this benefit should be extended to all married debtors, yet
to discharge their debts or protect their property. See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 439
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
117. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5818.
118. See In re Colwell, 208 B.R. 85, 85 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997) (allowing a legally
separated married couple who had lived apart for over three years and who had no
joint debts or assets to file a joint petition).
119. Debtors currently must pay $130 just to commence a case and $45 in adminis-
trative fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) (1994). Legal fees in Chapter 7 cases range
from $200 to $500. Telephone Interview with Debera Conlon, Assistant U.S. Trustee,
Eastern District of Virginia (Jan. 13, 1997) [hereinafter Conlon Interview]; see also In
re Crivilare, 213 B.R. 721, 723 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 997) (observing that the average fee
in Southern District of Illinois is $500). Attorneys' fees in a basic Chapter 13 case
range from $800 to $1,500. Conlon Interview, supra; see also In re Roffle, 216 B.R.
290, 296 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (capping fees in "vanilla" Chapter 13 case at $1,200);
In re Lee, 209 B.R. 708, 709 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1997) (noting that the maximum fee for
Chapter 13 case was $800); In re Taylor, 100 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989) (re-
ducing an award to $970 in a Chapter 13 case).
120. See In re Keiser, 204 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996). Although the
court in Kaiser acknowledged the local practice of excusing one spouse from attend-
ing the meeting of creditors required by § 341 of the Code, the court dismissed the
bankruptcy case of the non-attending spouse. Id. As the court noted, however, the
dismissal (indeed the entire controversy) primarily was a "struggle of wills" between
the United States Trustee's Office and the couple's attorney. Id.
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denied to all economically linked unmarried ones. Indeed, the cases
involving economically linked unmarried debtors who have attempted
to file a joint petition illustrate the inconsistency of limiting the right
to file a joint petition to married couples. For example, the debtors in
In re Allen121 were a gay couple who sought to file a joint Chapter 13
petition. 2 2 Without considering whether the debtors were linked eco-
nomically, or whether state marriage requirements violated the Due
Process or Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion,123 the court refused to allow the joint petition because the debt-
ors were not "spouses" as defined by the Code.'24 The court stressed
that since its holding applied to all unmarried couples, whether heter-
osexual or homosexual, it was not unfairly discriminating against
same-sex couples. 125 While implicitly recognizing that refusing to
grant a gay couple a marriage license might be a violation of equal
protection, the court refused to decide that issue. Instead the court
opined that if the debtors were "truly interested in pursuing their right
to enter into a legally recognized marriage," they should pursue their
legal remedies in state court.126
A mother and daughter with joint medical debts relating to injuries
the daughter received in a car accident attempted to file a joint peti-
tion in In re Lam.' 27 The debtors argued that "judicial (and debtor)
economy would be served by allowing the joint or co-filing.' 128 The
court concluded that joint filings are appropriate only where there is
an "identity" of assets and debts that warrants allowing two separate
entities to participate in one case.' 29 The court refused to allow the
mother and daughter to fie jointly because they only shared some
joint debt, did not live together, and did not own joint assets. 30 The
court reached this conclusion even though spouses can file a joint peti-
tion even if they shared no joint debts, lived apart, and owned no joint
assets.
In two cases where unmarried couples lived together, shared living
expenses, owned property together, and, in one case, raised children
together, courts still refused to permit a joint filing because the debt-
121. 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
122. See id. at 771.
123. See id. at 774
124. See id. at 773. With the recently enacted Defense of Marriage Act, bankruptcy
courts currently cannot allow a gay couple to file jointly unless they find the Act to be
unconstitutional.
125. Id. at 774.
126. Id.
127. 98 B.R. 965, 966 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id.; see also In re Jackson, 28 B.R. 559, 564 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (deny-
ing joint filing for parents and child).
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ors were not spouses within the meaning of the Code.13" ' While the
courts indicated their willingness to jointly administer the cases after
they were filed, this would not obviate the initial requirement that
both debtors hire an attorney and both pay a filing fee. Indeed, the
one court that has permitted an unmarried couple to file jointly al-
lowed the filing only because the debtors were ex-spouses.132 Ac-
knowledging that the divorced debtors technically were not spouses,
the court relied on the legislative history of § 302 to conclude that
allowing these ex-spouses to file a joint Chapter 13 petition was con-
sistent with bankruptcy policy. 33
Since Congress allows joint filings to facilitate the administration of
what it assumes are economically linked debtors (i.e., a husband and
wife), it is unclear why this benefit should not be extended to any
economically linked debtors, whether married or not. Allowing all
married couples (even those who do not share debts and assets) to file
a joint petition but denying that right to all unmarried couples (even if
they can show they actually have merged their financial lives) makes
no sense if Congress views joint filings as vehicles to simplify the pro-
cess of administering the estates of economically linked debtors. Al-
lowing all economically linked couples to file jointly would be
consistent with bankruptcy policy because the savings in legal and fil-
ing fees could be given either to the debtors (to protect their fresh
start) or to creditors (to repay debts). Moreover, because the deter-
mination to allow a joint petition would examine the debtors' eco-
nomic (not personal) relationship, courts could allow joint filings
without becoming embroiled in a constitutional determination of
whether states may deny certain legal rights to people simply because
of the their marital status.13 4
2. Property Held as Tenants by the Entirety
The Code also gives married debtors the right to shield property
held as tenants by the entirety from their creditors because it incorpo-
rates the favorable status states accord entirety property.1 31 Relying
131. See In re Malone, 50 B.R. 2,3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5,
6 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
132. See In re Pipes 78 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
133. See id. at 983 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 321 (1977). reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6277).
134. The Defense of Marriage Act suggests that Congress now believes it necessary
to protect the institution of formal heterosexual marriages. See supra notes 1, 6; infra
note 201. Because I suggest later that any unmarried couple-whether same sex lov-
ers, unmarried male and female lovers, a parent and child, or siblings-be allowed to
fie jointly if they can establish that they are an "economic unit," permitting unmar-
ried couples to file jointly would not threaten the institution of marriage or require
federal bankruptcy or district courts to recognize any type of informal marriage. See
infra Part IV.
135. Congress allows states to determine whether debtors may rely on state or fed-
eral exemptions to keep property from creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1994).
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on state entirety laws is consistent with the bankruptcy laws' "fresh
start" policy because those laws were designed to prevent one
spouse's separate creditors from seizing all marital assets and using
those assets to pay that spouse's debts. 136 Because the tenancy de-
pended on the legal fiction that man and woman merged at mar-
riage, 137 historically the tenancy required that: (1) each spouse have a
right of survivorship in entirety property; (2) the spouses acquire the
same interest in the property by the same instrument at the same
time; and (3) the spouses have an undivided interest in the entire
property. 138
More than half of the states prevent debtors from using the federal exemptions and,
instead, require debtors to exempt property pursuant to applicable state laws. See 4
Collier on Bankruptcy 522.02[1], at 522-13 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed.
1996). Debtors who either live in states that have opted out of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions or choose to rely on state law to exempt property may exclude tenant by
the entireties property from their bankruptcy estates and thus prevent the trustee
from using that property to satisfy creditor claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
136. Yzenbaard, supra note 27, at 102-04.
137. See Powell, supra note 44, 620[3].
138. See Janet D. Ritsko, Comment, Lien Times in Massachusetts: Tenancy by the
Entirety After Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, 30 New Eng. L. Rev. 85,
92-95 (1995). Though modern entirety laws have changed somewhat since the com-
mon law, modern laws (1) maintain the right of survivorship; (2) prevent entirety
property from being subject to partition; and (3) prevent spouses from disposing of
any part of entirety property or using the property to pay individual debts without the
consent of the other spouse. See Benjamin C. Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Prop-
erty and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 43 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 701, 703 (1980). Ten-
ancy by the entirety laws have existed in forty states. Several states abolished the
tenancy because it conflicted with community property laws or perpetuated the now
outdated view of marriage as merger. See Section on Real Property, Probate, and
Trust Law, American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on Changes in Substantive
Real Property Principles 82 (1944). Estimates of the number of jurisdictions in which
the tenancy is still recognized range from as few as seventeen to as many as thirty-
seven. See Powell, supra note 44, T 620[4]; Ritsko, supra, at 87 n.16; see, e.g., Alaska
Stat. §§ 34.15.140(c), 34.15.110(b) (Michie 1996) (confirming the right of tenancy by
the entirety); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-317 B (Michie 1998) (discussing dissolution of
tenancy by the entirety); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, 309 (1989) (recognizing tenancy by
the entirety); D.C. Code Ann. § 45-216 (1996) (creating the presumption of tenancy in
common unless expressly stated otherwise); Fla. Stat. §§ 689.11, 689.15 (West 1994)
(recognizing tenancy by the entirety); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 509-1, 509-2 (1993) (constru-
ing tenancy in common as the default formation, but recognizing tenancy by the en-
tirety); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1005/Ic (West 1993) (unpholding tenancy by the
entirety); Ind. Code Ann. § 32-4-2-1 (Michie 1995) (recognizing tenancy by the en-
tirety); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381.050 (Michie Supp. 1996) (creating a tenancy in com-
mon unless the right of survivorship is expressly mentioned); Md. Code Ann. Real
Prop. § 4-108 (1996) (recognizing tenancy by the entirety); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184,
§ 8 (Law Co-op. 1996) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 552-102, 557-71, 557-81,
557-101 (West 1998) (detailing procedures and particulars for tenancy by the en-
tirety); N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 6-2.2(b) (McKinney 1992) (creating a pre-
sumption of tenancy by the entirety between husband and wife); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 39-13.3(b), 39-13.6(b) (1984) (same); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 74 (West 1994) (rec-
ognizing tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy as the grantor may elect); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 108.090 (1990) (discussing creation and dissolution of estates by entireties); 23
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3507 (West 1991) (dictating that in cases of divorce, tenancy by
the entirety becomes tenancy in common); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-11-3 (1995) (recogniz-
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Despite the potential harm to individual creditors, states enacted
entirety laws to ensure that, notwithstanding one spouse's financial
difficulties, a married couple could keep their basic family assets (par-
ticularly the family home) and avoid being forced into poverty. 39
Under most state laws, only creditors with a claim against both
spouses may reach entirety property.140 Thus, unless state law allows
individual creditors to reach entireties property, 141 if only one spouse
files for bankruptcy, the debtor can keep or "exempt" entirety prop-
erty and prevent separate creditors from satisfying their debts with the
entirety property.
42
ing tenancy by the entirety); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-1-109 to -110 (1993) (permitting
tenancy by the entirety); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 67 (1989) (upholding tenancy by the
entirety); Va. Code Ann. § 55-21 (Michie 1995) (maintaining the right of survivorship
when it "manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument" that survivorship was
intended); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-140 (Michie 1997) (permitting the creation of a
tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy without a straw person).
139. The policy justification for state homestead laws is also to shield basic family
assets from the reach of creditors. Homestead acts allow a householder to designate a
house and land as his homestead and then exempt the homestead from execution by
the owner's creditors. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 207 B.R. 878, 881 n.6 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1997) (noting that Minnesota homestead exemption laws are designed to prevent the
"destitution and dependency of families, and of promoting their stability, self-suste-
nance, and independence over the generations"); Kingman v. O'Callaghan, 57 N.W.
912, 915 (S.D. 1894) ("The object of all homestead legislation is to protect the home,
to furnish shelter for the family, and to promote the interest and welfare of society
and the state by restricting... alienation or encumbrance by the owner's sole act and
deed."); George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 Harv. L Rev. 1289, 1289 n.4
(1950) (citing Act of Jan. 26, 1839, [1838-40] Laws of the Republic of Tex., 3d Cong.,
1st Sess. 113). Homestead property is exempt (up to varying dollar amounts) from
execution for certain kinds of debts. These dollar amounts vary greatly, ranging from
an unlimited amount in some states to a much more modest amount in others. Com-
pare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 222.01 (West 1998) (discussing the homestead exemption), and
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 41.001 (West 1984) (unlimited homestead exemption), with
Ga. Code Ann. § 44-13-1 (Supp. 1998) (limiting homestead exemption to $5,000), and
Va. Code Ann. § 34-4 (Michie 1996) (same).
140. See In re Oberlies, 94 B.R. 916, 923 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (noting that
under Michigan law, a trustee could administer entirety assets for the benefit of joint
creditors); In re Townsend, 72 B.R. 960 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); Ackerly, supra note
138, at 702-03. In addition to preventing commercial creditors from collecting debts,
it is estimated that in 1995 over 250,000 parents who were obliged to pay child support
effectively shielded assets from child support recipients by creating entireties estates.
See Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy By The Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified
Safe Haven For Delinquent Child Support Obligors, 29 Val. U. L Rev. 1057, 1092
(1995).
141. Several jurisdictions continue to permit only joint creditors to reach entirety
property. See John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety, in 4 Thompson on Real Prop-
erty § 33.07(e) n.111 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994 & Supp. 1997).
142. Entirety property is deemed "destroyed" only when both the husband and
wife acting jointly file a joint petition and effectively "convey" the property to the
trustee. Only if destroyed would the property be available to all creditors (joint and
separate) on an equal basis under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B). See Grant v. Himmel-
stein, 203 B.R. 1009, 1013 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996); see also Community Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Persky, 893 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1989); Kirschenbaum v. Feola, 22 B.R. 81,
85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (declaring § 522(b)(2)(B) a "nullity" in New York).
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Even if the debtors could not exempt entirety property, the Code
currently curtails a trustee's ability to sell non-exempt entirety prop-
erty. 43 A trustee ordinarily has the power to sell a debtor's property
free and clear of any other interest as long as the co-owner con-
sents. 144 The trustee can only sell entirety property, however, if it can
be shown that: (1) the property cannot easily be partitioned; (2) sell-
ing only the estate's interest would yield significantly less than selling
the property free of the non-debtor spouse's interest; and (3) the ben-
efit (to the debtor's bankruptcy estate) of selling the home outweighs
the harm to the non-debtor spouse. 145 Because selling a family home
often causes extreme harm to a non-debtor spouse (especially a home-
maker spouse), trustees often fail to satisfy the third requirement and,
thus, cannot sell the entirety property. 146 Finally, while courts have
not fully resolved when entirety property can be sold or how to gener-
ally treat entirety property when a non-filing spouse is present,1
47
most courts conclude that a trustee cannot sell either the debtor's or
143. See In re Siegel, 204 B.R. 6, 9 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that a trustee's
ability to sell entireties property raises a "myriad of difficult issues" and that this
ability may be "subject to both statutory and constitutional limitations").
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(2) (1994).
145. See id. § 363(h)(1)-(3). The trustee also must give the non-filing spouse the
right of first refusal. See id. § 363(i).
146. Trustees fairly easily satisfy the first two requirements. Because most entirety
property is the family home, it is often difficult to partition the home effectively. See
Berland v. Gauthreaux, 206 B.R. 502, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Bakst v. Griffin, 123
B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); Neylon v. Addario, 53 B.R. 335, 338 (D. Mass.
1985). Likewise, because many state laws limit the estate's interest in the entirety
property to the right of survivorship, trustees easily show that selling the undivided
interest in the entireties property would realize significantly less for the estate than
selling the property free and clear of the non-debtor's interest. See Gauthreaux, 206
B.R. at 505; Armstrong v. Trout, 146 B.R. 823, 829 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992). Because
courts frequently consider non-economic factors when valuing the "detriment" to the
non-debtor spouse if the trustee is allowed to sell the family home, trustees frequently
fail to satisfy the third requirement. See Persky, 893 F.2d at 20-21 (noting that a non-
debtor spouse is unlikely to find new home for minor children); Gauthreaux, 206 B.R.
at 505-06 (non-debtor spouse contributed all money to purchase property and would
incur substantial tax consequences if property was sold); Siegel, 204 B.R. at 7 (holding
that a sale would deprive a wife of her home of 22 years and would not produce
proceeds adequate to acquire comparable residence); In re Waxman, 128 B.R. 49, 53
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (observing that a wife had strong family and religious ties to
the community); Salem v. Coombs, 86 B.R. 314, 316 (D. Mass. 1988) (noting a co-
owner's physical disabilities). See generally Price v. Harris, 155 B.R. 948, 950 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1993) (citing supporting cases).
147. Compare In re Shaw, 5 B.R. 107, 111 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that
courts cannot sell a non-debtor's interest unless the debtor's entire interest in the
property was part of the estate), with In re Dawson, 10 B.R. 680, 687 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1981) (explaining that while a court can sell a debtor's right of survivorship, the
right is typically worth little and sale would not be allowed because of harm to non-
debtor spouse resulting from sale).
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non-debtor spouse's interest in entirety property unless a creditor ex-
ists who has a joint claim against both spouses.1 4
Laws permitting property owners to exempt property (including en-
tirety property) initially had the same policy consideration as bank-
ruptcy laws, i.e., to preserve small, sentimental items of property and
to prevent families from sinking into poverty.1 49 State laws that allow
debtors to hold potentially extravagant real or personal property as
tenants by the entirety,150 however, no longer appear consistent with
the policy objectives of bankruptcy laws. Moreover, allowing married
couples to rely on state entirety laws unavailable to unmarried couples
creates both an over- and under-inclusive system. It is over-inclusive
because it allows all married debtors to exempt entirety property even
if they live apart, do not have joint debts, or (other than owning en-
tirety property) appear to have separate economic lives. It is under-
inclusive because no unmarried debtor can shield entirety property
from creditors even if the debtor and another person own property
jointly, have joint debts, and have merged their lives economically.
For example, a debtor who is a widower with three minor children,
or a debtor who cohabits with his lover and their children, cannot hold
property as tenants by the entirety under state law and, thus, cannot
shield it from creditors in bankruptcy. Unless he can rely on a state
homestead law to exempt the property, the debtor cannot shield his
property from creditors even if he desires to protect his family's home
or if losing that home forces him and his children into poverty. Simi-
larly, an elderly couple may own a home together but choose not to
marry for fear of losing social security or other retirement benefits.
Though resembling a married couple in all aspects other than holding
148. See In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 40-41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997); cf In re Lashley,
206 B.R. 950, 952 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (stating that a debtor has the right to avoid
a creditor's lien on entireties property even though the creditor has a joint judgment
against both debtor and non-debtor spouse); In re Himmelstein, 203 B.R. 1009, 1014
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (ruling that a claim must be reduced to judgment).
149. See In re Ellingson, 63 B.R. 271, 277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (noting that
exemptions further social policies of giving debtors property necessary to survive,
protecting debtors' dignity and cultural and religious identity, giving debtors a chance
to rehabilitate and earn future income, protecting debtors' families from impoverish-
ment, and shifting the burden of supporting debtors from society to creditors). See
generally Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of
Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on tie Eve of Bankruptcy,
31 Rutgers L. Rev. 615, 620-27 (1978) (discussing the origin and development of ex-
emption laws and the policies exemption laws should further).
150. See, eg., In re Garner, 952 F.2d 232, 233 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that a couple
owned over 6000 shares of stock held as tenants by the entirety); Ramsey v. Ramsey,
531 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ark. 1975) (promissory notes); Weathersbee v. Wallace, 686
S.YV.2d 447, 450 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985) (certificates of deposits); Colclazier v. Col-
clazier, 89 So. 2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1956) (corporate stock); Jones v. Jones, 270 A.2d 126,
128 (Md. 1970) (citing a case in which a motor boat was held by a couple as tenants by
the entirety); Cohen v. Goldberg, 244 A.2d 763, 764 (Pa. 1968) (savings accounts); In
re Estate of Holmes, 200 A.2d 745, 746-47 (Pa. 1964) (stocks); In re McEwen's Estate,
33 A.2d 14, 15 (Pa. 1943) (beneficial interest in a trust).
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a state-issued marriage license, this couple could not own their home
as tenants by the entirety even though losing their home could send
them into poverty. Finally, elderly siblings or an elderly parent and
child may choose to pool their assets, live together, and save expenses
but could not shield their property from creditors even though their
economic lives may be merged.
Because the Code relies on state laws, Congress understandably al-
lows only legally married couples to claim entirety property as ex-
empt. Congress is not required, however, to recognize this tenancy in
bankruptcy merely because state law recognizes the tenancy.
15 1
Throughout the Code, Congress has elected to either modify or ignore
debtors' and creditors' state-created property interests if doing so fur-
thers the substantive goals of federal bankruptcy laws. 5 1 While bank-
ruptcy courts generally should adopt state law definitions of property
interests to avoid forum shopping, 153 bankruptcy laws exist to create a
unified federal collection system that operates independent of the va-
garies and inconsistencies of various state laws.' 54 Thus, while Con-
151. See In re Jeffers, 3 B.R. 49,56 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980) ("There is no doubt that
Congress can, through its constitutional authority to establish 'uniform laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,' change state-created property
rights."); see also Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 10 (1931) (concluding that "the Bank-
ruptcy Act ... is superior to all state laws upon the subject"). But see Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (requiring bankruptcy courts to interpret laws in a way
that prevents a party from receiving a windfall simply because the dispute is resolved
in a federal bankruptcy court, rather than a state court (quoting Lewis v. Manufactur-
ers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
152. For example, the trustee has the right under 11 U.S.C. § 544 to avoid liens as a
"hypothetical creditor" even though none of the debtor's creditors actually could
avoid the lien under state law. In addition, the Code gives trustees the right to avoid
certain pre-petition transfers as preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547 even though there
is no state law analogue to § 547. Finally, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209-12 (1983), concluded that the IRS was required
to return property of the debtor that it seized pre-petition even though the debtor
would have no right to force the IRS to return the property under applicable state
law.
153. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (emphasizing that, absent countervailing federal
interests, courts should adopt a state's definition of property interests). For a general
discussion of the need to prevent forum shopping in bankruptcy disputes, see gener-
ally Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 825-28 (1987), and Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests:
A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 97, 100-01 (1984).
154. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Hillsborough County v. Automated
Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) ("Even where Congress has not completely
displaced State regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law."); In re Baker, 35 F.3d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir. 1994)
(stating that federal bankruptcy preemption is more likely to occur where a state stat-
ute makes an exception out of the Bankruptcy Code or where the statute is concerned
with economic regulation rather than the protection of the public health and safety);
In re Di Giorgio, 200 B.R. 664, 669 (D. Cal. 1996) ("The Supremacy Clause invali-
dates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law .... " (quoting
Baker, 35 F.3d at 1353)).
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gress may choose to recognize state-defined property rights, there is
no constitutional or statutory requirement that federal bankruptcy
laws adopt state law characterizations of property. Conversely, Con-
gress is not constitutionally or statutorily prohibited from giving un-
married debtors additional protections in property even if state law
does not favorably treat such property.'55
The fact that Congress allows married debtors to rely on state laws
to shield entirety property from creditors is not unreasonable. Be-
cause doing so unfairly discriminates against unmarried debtors with-
out clearly promoting marriage, however, there is no theoretical
justification for continuing to grant this status-based benefit. Indeed,
it is unclear why Congress continues to look to state laws in shaping
the Code, given the difficulties lower courts have faced when forced to
interpret and apply those laws. 56 Congress may recognize entirety
laws because it does not want to give creditors protections in bank-
ruptcy that are not available under state laws and to prevent forum
shopping. It cannot be said, however, that this promotes marriage. If
Congress recognizes entirety laws because it concludes that having a
place to live is consistent with bankruptcy's "fresh start" policy, this
fresh start should protect the homes of all debtors, whether they are
married, single, economically linked or not. In short, whether bank-
ruptcy laws recognize entirety laws either to discourage forum shop-
ping or to protect the fresh start, it cannot reasonably be argued that
recognizing these laws promotes marriage or that bankruptcy laws
should promote marriage.
3. Expenses for Non-Debtor Spouse
In states that permit debtors to use federal bankruptcy exemptions
to keep property, 5 7 a debtor can treat the non-debtor spouse as a
"dependent" and exempt both property that his "dependent" spouse
uses as a residence 58 and, in addition, a limited amount of jewelry and
professional supplies the "dependent" spouse uses. 159 Because the
term "dependent" is defined to include a spouse "whether or not actu-
155. For example, federal bankruptcy exemptions allow debtors to exempt up to
$15,000 in value in real property the debtor or the debtor's dependent uses as a resi-
dence. See 11 U.S.C § 522(d)(1) (1994). To provide at least some benefits to non-
homeowners, the Code allows debtors who did not use the full S15,000 exemption to
use up to $7,500 to exempt any property. See id. § 522(d)(5). More than half of the
states prevent debtors from electing to use these exemptions. See Collier on Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 135, at 522-23 n.4a. This exemption, however, is available when
applicable for non-homeowners even if they would not be entitled to exempt property
under applicable state law.
156. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
157. The report prepared by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission pro-
poses that Congress enact uniform federal exemptions. See National Bankruptcy Re-
view Commission, supra note 12, at 121-24.
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1), (d)(1).
159. See id. § 522(d)(4), (6).
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ally dependent, ' 160 debtors can exempt this property without proving
either that the non-filing spouse cannot afford to purchase those items
with the non-fier's own income or that the non-filer is in any way
economically dependent on the debtor. Similarly, debtors may treat
their non-debtor spouses as dependents and include the spouses' ex-
penses in the budget they prepare in their Chapter 13 cases.1 61 While
many courts consider a non-filing spouse's income as well as expenses
when considering the amount of "reasonably necessary" expenses a
Chapter 13 debtor can include in a proposed budget,162 the Code does
not require that non-debtor spouses prove that they are incapable of
paying their own expenses (by, for example, earning wages outside the
home or finding a higher-paying job) or that they are economically
dependent on the debtor. Finally, debtors may treat their non-debtor
spouses as dependents when claiming a right to exempt certain retire-
ment income that is "reasonably necessary" for the debtor's or
spouse's support. 16 3
If a debtor provides all (or nearly all) the financial support for a
non-debtor, the non-debtor's expenses should be considered during
the debtor's bankruptcy case even if the parties are not married. Be-
cause there is no general definition for "dependent,"' and the one
definition the Code provides is not exclusive, it is at least conceivable
that a cohabitant could be construed as a "dependent" if her cohab-
iting partner filed a bankruptcy petition. For a number of reasons,
however, cohabiting partners probably would not be treated as each
other's dependents. First, courts historically have been reluctant to
grant benefits to unmarried couples if those benefits are ones that are
160. Id. § 522(a)(1).
161. See id. § 1325(b)(2)(A).
162. Chapter 13 debtors must disclose their spouses' income on their bankruptcy
schedules. See Schedule I, Form Six, Current Income of Individual Debtor(s).
Although no statutory authority requires this, courts routinely consider the non-
debtor spouse's income when deciding whether a debtor has committed all disposable
income to funding a Chapter 13 plan. See In re Mathenia, 220 B.R. 427 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1998); In re Velis, 123 B.R. 497, 511-12 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991); In re Harmon, 118
B.R. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990); In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 561-62 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1989); In re Smith, 98 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (citing In re Kern, 40
B.R. 26, 28-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)); In re Strong, 84 B.R. 541, 543 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1988); In re Saunders, 60 B.R. 187, 188 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Sellers, 33
B.R. 854, 857 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). Creditors often argue that it is unfair to allow
debtors to use separate income for family necessities unless the court considers the
extent to which the non-filing spouse's income would remain "disposable" to the
debtor, but uncommitted to the plan. See In re Soper, 152 B.R. 985, 988 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1993). Courts also consider the non-debtor spouse's income when deciding
whether a debtor's student loan should be discharged because it would be an "undue
hardship" to force repayment. See In re Lezer, 21 B.R. 783, 789 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Bagley, 4 B.R. 248, 249 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1980).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). See Velis, 123 B.R. at 512 (discussing § 522(d)(10)
and referring to the "Bankruptcy Code fiction that a non-debtor spouse is a depen-
dent of the debtor spouse regardless of actual dependency").
164. See 11 U.S.C. § 101.
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typically associated with marriage.'65 Second, just as people in com-
mon law marriages find it difficult to prove the existence of their mar-
riage,'6 6 cohabiting partners would have a difficult time convincing a
bankruptcy court that they should be treated as dependents since they
probably have no legal duty to support each other. Third, bankruptcy
courts may be reluctant to extend bankruptcy protections to non-legal
dependents, given their general unwillingness to allow debtors to
avoid paying debts simply because the debtor wants to support a non-
legal dependent.167 Finally, since the Defense of Marriage Act makes
it abundantly clear that Congress wants to restrict marriage benefits
only to those who have a state-issued license, it is quite possible that
bankruptcy courts would be hesitant to interpret "dependent" to in-
clude a cohabiting partner.
If a debtor has agreed to support her non-filing cohabitant and the
non-filer is actually dependent on the debtor, courts should not ignore
the cohabitant's expenses in the debtor's bankruptcy case. Neverthe-
less, bankruptcy courts conceivably could adopt a narrow interpreta-
tion of the term "dependent" and find that it includes only a spouse,
child, or other person who has a legal relationship with the debtor. If
courts adopt such a definition, the Code would again be both over and
under-inclusive because an unmarried debtor could not exempt prop-
erty used by her actually dependent cohabitant or include her cohabi-
tant's expenses in her budget even though a married debtor could
exempt property used by her financially independent husband and
could include his expenses in her Chapter 13 budget.
4. Benefits Available to Cohabitants
At least two benefits that most likely were designed to protect non-
debtor spouses currently are available to non-debtor cohabitants.
Creditors of a Chapter 12 or 13 debtor generally cannot attempt to
165. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
167. For example, the debtors in In re Ridnond, 144 B.R. 539 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1992), sought relief in Chapter 7 because they could not afford both to repay their
debts in a Chapter 13 plan and to provide support to members of their extended
family. See id. at 540-41. The court dismissed the Chapter 7 case, finding that the
debtors had no duty to support family members who are not their legal dependents.
See id. at 542; see also In re Davidoff, 185 B.R. 631, 635-36 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)
(dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in part because the debtor intended to support his
adult children and his second wife's child even though his wife received substantial
child support payments from the child's biological father); In re Bacco, 160 B.R. 283,
289 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition in part because the
debtor proposed to pay a debt for which his father also was liable): In re Peluso, 72
B.R. 732, 738 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987) (dismissing a Chapter 7 petition because the
debtor willingly incurred additional monetary obligations including his proposal to
subsidize the automobile insurance and the monthly telephone charges of his emanci-
pated, employed son).
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collect consumer debts168 from anyone who is jointly liable with the
debtor until the Chapter 12 or 13 case is closed, dismissed, or con-
verted to a Chapter 7 or 11 case.1 69 Thus, if the co-signor acted as a
guarantor and received no direct benefit as a result of the debt, Con-
gress temporarily 7 ° insulates debtors from the indirect pressure they
might feel if creditors pursued innocent friends or relatives who co-
signed the debt as a favor to the debtor. 171 Because this benefit is not
limited to spouses or dependents, creditors would also be prevented
from collecting a debt co-signed by a debtor's non-marital partner
(unless the partner was the actual beneficiary of the debt). Similarly,
the Code allows debtors to repay co-signed consumer debts at a
higher rate than other debts. 72 Courts allow this because they believe
that this treatment increases the likelihood that the debtor will devote
all future income to making plan payments, rather than attempting to
protect a friend or loved one by trying to find a way to both make plan
payments and to repay the co-signed debt in full. 173
Since Congress did not restrict co-signor protections to spouses, the
bankruptcy system at least implicitly concedes that a debtor may have
an economic relationship with a person who is not a spouse or depen-
dent and that creditors and debtors may benefit if the debtor is al-
lowed to protect a non-spouse co-signor. Given this, the fact that
most benefits currently available to a debtor's spouse do not appear
designed to protect or promote marriage, and the fact that awarding
168. A consumer debt is defined as a debt incurred primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(8).
169. See id. § 1301(a)(2). Creditors are allowed to collect the debt if (1) the co-
debtor became liable on the debt in the ordinary course of her business, (2) the debt
was actually designed to benefit the co-debtor, (3) the debtor's Chapter 13 plan does
not propose to pay the creditor in full, or (4) the creditor would be irreparably
harmed if it is not allowed to collect the debt. See id. § 1301(a)(1), (c)(1)-(3); see also
id. § 1201(a) (co-debtor protection in Chapter 12 family farmer cases).
170. Creditors can petition the court to have the automatic stay lifted to enable
them to collect the debt from the co-obligor and, in any event, can pursue the co-
obligor for any deficiency amount if the debtor does not fully repay the creditor. See
id. § 1301(c).
171. See In re Case, 148 B.R. 901, 902 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); H.R. Rep. No. 95-
595, at 426 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5811.
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1); In re Chapman, 146 B.R. 411,416 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992); In re Dornon, 103 B.R. 61, 65 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Todd, 65 B.R. 249,
253 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Perkins, 55 B.R. 422, 425-26 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1985). Indeed, courts have confirmed plans that repaid joint unsecured debts in full
while giving other unsecured debts less than 10%. See, e.g., Spokane Ry. Credit Union
v. Gonzales, 172 B.R. 320, 328 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that co-signed debts
may be classified separately from other unsecured debts); Dornon, 103 B.R. at 62
(same). But see In re Battista, 180 B.R. 355, 357 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (refusing to
confirm plan that paid co-debtor claims in full but paid other unsecured claims only
six percent).
173. See Battista, 180 B.R. at 357; In re Martin, 189 B.R. 619, 627-28 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1995); Gonzales, 172 B.R. at 328-30; In re Cheak, 171 B.R. 55, 57-58 (Bankr. S.D.
Ill. 1994); In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948, 956 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987); Todd, 65 B.R. at
252-53; Perkins, 55 B.R. at 425-26.
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most marital benefits creates a flawed over and under-inclusive sys-
tem, bankruptcy laws should be revised to award benefits without re-
gard to marital status.
IV. AWARDING BANKRUPTCY BENEFITS BASED ON ECONOMIC,
NOT MARITAL, RELATIONSHIPS
Because many of the legal distinctions between married and unmar-
ried couples have largely disappeared,'74 Congress should revise the
current bankruptcy system to ensure that it awards benefits based on
the economic, rather than the marital, relationship between two indi-
viduals. Just as tax scholars have noted when discussing whether mar-
ried couples should be granted favorable tax benefits, 7 little
174. For example, wives can now sue their husbands for assault and battery and
spouses can be prosecuted for rape. See State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that a spouse could be prosecuted for sexual battery upon the
other spouse); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1985) (holding that there is no
implicit marital exemption for rape and aggravated sodomy); People v. De Stefano,
467 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983) (declaring that a rape statute that grants
husband immunity from prosecution would violate the equal protection clause of state
and federal constitutions); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 1984)
(affirming a spousal rape conviction because a wife revoked her implied consent to
marital sex). In addition, unmarried couples can now legally have sex in all but thir-
teen states and the District of Columbia, which still maintain their fornication stat-
utes. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1002 (1996) (making fornication punishable by
$300 fine or six months imprisonment or both); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-18 (1996) (de-
fining fornication as a misdemeanor); Idaho Code § 18-6603 (1997) (prohibiting un-
married people of the opposite sex from having sexual intercourse); 720 I11. Comp.
Stat. 5/11-8 (West 1993) (making fornication punishable as a Class -B" misdemeanor);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 18 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (making fornication punishable by
imprisonment of not more than three months or fine not more than $30); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.34 (West 1987) (defining fornication as a misdemeanor); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 97-29-1 (1994) (making fornication punishable by not more than $500 fine and im-
prisonment for not more than six months); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-10-2 (Michie 1994)
(warning fornicators to cease and desist); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-184 (1993) (defining
fornication as a Class "2" misdemeanor); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-10 (1997) (defin-
ing fornication as a Class "B" misdemeanor); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op.
1985) (making fornication punishable by fine of S100-S500 or imprisonment for six to
twelve months or both); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-104 (1995) (defining fornication as a
Class "B" misdemeanor); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1996) (defining fornica-
tion as a Class "4" misdemeanor); W. Va. Code § 61-8-3 (1997) (making fornication
punishable by fine of not less than $20).
175. Several authors have advanced arguments concerning the significance of mari-
tal status in income taxation. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the
Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389 (1975); Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a
Factor In Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1980); Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tar
Return, 45 Hastings L.J. 63 (1993); Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined Marital Status:
Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 257 (1983); Edward J.
McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency,
and Social Change, 103 Yale L.J. 595, 617-19 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation
and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L
Rev. 983 (1993); Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marty in Haste, Repent at Tar
7ue: Marital Status as a Tax Deterninant, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 773 (1989); Jeanette An-
derson Wmn & Marshall Winn, Till Death Do We Split: Married Couples and Single
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empirical evidence exists to determine the extent to which married
couples are justifiably entitled to bankruptcy benefits because they
share income or debts. 176 Without citing any empirical evidence,
many bankruptcy courts, like Congress, make decisions based on their
assumption that married couples maintain a joint household.177 Given
the temporal nature of many marriages, 78  and the statistical
probability that fifty percent of all marriages will end in divorce,1 79 it
is increasingly unlikely that modern marriages will be "traditional"
ones where the spouses pool and share all income, own all assets
jointly, and are jointly liable for all debts. Indeed, since most marital
unions consist of two market wage-earners, is° spouses (especially
higher income ones) in some marriages may choose to have com-
pletely separate financial lives.' 8 ' Conversely, the drastic increase in
the number of unmarried, cohabiting couples, some of whom may
choose to have interlocking economic lives, further suggests that
Persons Under the Individual Income Tax, 34 S.C. L. Rev. 829 (1983); Lawrence
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (1994).
176. Kornhauser, supra note 175, at 80. Many family law scholars assume that
spouses share at least some financial resources and that spouses presume that they
will pool their funds. See Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 51, at 2385-86
nn.390-94.
177. See, e.g., In re Carter, 205 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing the
"reality that married couples live as a unit, pooling their income and expenses"); In re
Berndt, 127 B.R. 222, 225 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1991) ("As husband and wife . . . the
Debtor and his non-joining spouse maintain a joint household and most of their living
expenses are, as is typical, incurred in that fashion without segregation or regard as to
which spouse consumed the benefit."); see also Chambers, supra note 76, at 470-71
(observing that laws providing favorable treatment to married couples "build on be-
liefs or guesses about the economic relationships that married persons actually have
and on prescriptive views about what those relationships ought to be").
178. See Fineman, supra note 22, at 4 (describing marriage as the "most tenuous,
least permanent, of our intimate relationships that is afforded the most significant and
privileged position in both public and private institutions-subsidized on both ideo-
logical and economic levels"); see also Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1179-80
(1992) (describing marriage as having an "indeterminate duration" (quoting Homer
H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 2.1, at 30 (2d ed.
1987))).
179. See supra note 13.
180. See Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 22 (Ct. App. 1993) (Poch6, J.,
dissenting) ("For better or worse, we have to a great extent left behind the comforta-
ble and familiar gender-based roles evoked by Norman Rockwell paintings."). See
generally Steven Mintz, New Rules: Postwar Families, in American Families: A Re-
search Guide and Historical Handbook 184 (Joseph M. Hawes & Elizabeth I. Nybak-
ken eds., 1991).
181. See Schmuckler, supra note 75, at 364. One comprehensive study of gay and
straight married and unmarried couples concluded that only those couples who be-
lieved their marriages would last forever completely merged their lives financially. See
Philip Blumstein & Pepper Schwartz, American Couples 103-05 (1983).
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awarding public-or private' m -benefits based on marital status"m is
no longer justified."
While one bankruptcy court was willing to assume, for limited pur-
poses, that (1) a debtor, his cohabitant, and their children were a fam-
ily unit, (2) he could claim expenses for her, and (3) her income
should be considered when calculating his income,"as it is unclear
whether unmarried couples actually share living expenses and jointly
own assets at a rate equal to or greater than married couples."m In-
deed, the limited available empirical evidence suggests that most un-
married couples do not pool their assets because they realize that they
generally cannot rely on state laws to protect them if they need to
disentangle their lives.'87 According to the most comprehensive sur-
vey of the economic relationships of married and unmarried couples,
182. Bank of America, one of the nation's largest financial institutions, recently
extended health benefits to its employees' extended families. By allowing employees
to designate a spouse, unmarried partner, sibling, or parent (up to age 65) as a benefit
recipient, the company acknowledged that many employees support families that in-
clude more than just their spouses and their children. See Edmund Sanders, B of A
Offers Partners and Extended Families Benefits, Orange County Reg., Mar. 12, 1997,
at C4; see also Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. App.
1985) (detailing insurance dispute involving same-sex couple who lived together for
over 12 years, had joint bank accounts, were named as the primary beneficiary in each
other's wills and insurance policies and otherwise "shared the common necessities of
life"); Brinikin v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., No. 796 271, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 1987) (detailing bereavement leave dispute involving same sex couple
who lived together and shared expenses). See generally Robert L Eblin, Domestic
Partnership Recognition in the Workplace" Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay
Couples (and Others), 51 Ohio. St. LJ. 1067, 1078-79 (1990) (discussing steps taken by
an employee to secure benefits for his domestic partner).
183. See generally Regan, Family Law, supra note 19, at 39-41 (discussing the de-
clining importance of status); Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 688-
93 (discussing increasingly tolerant judicial attitudes toward informal relationships);
Schneider, supra note 50, at 1820 (discussing the change in the nature of the moral
discourse in family law).
184. Denying benefits to unmarried debtors may especially burden women, many
of whom have a shared financial relationship with people other than spouses. See
Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 198-99 (observing that the lower-class black
family has frequently been characterized as an extended matriarchal family which
emphasizes blood, not conjugal, relationships); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking De-
pendency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2181, 2190 (1995)
(discussing the role of the extended family in the African-American community);
Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors,
88 Mich. L. Rev. 1506, 1552 (1990) (noting that bankruptcy law fails to recognize the
changing nature of the American family structure); see also Special Comm. on Gen-
der, D.C. Cir. Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, Report of the Special
Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic
Bias (1996) (noting that access to bankruptcy protections may be denied to some indi-
viduals because of the Code's restrictions on the types of couples who are allowed to
file a joint bankruptcy petition), reprinted in 84 Geo. LJ. 1657, 1758 n.145.
185. In re Bicsak, 207 B.R. 657, 658 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997).
186. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at 684-97 (dis-
cussing the emerging trend of cohabiting couples).
187. See Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 181, at 97.
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gay couples pool their money only when their relationship is a long-
term one-such as marriage-which they believe will last forever.' 88
As a matter of bankruptcy policy, however, it is irrelevant whether
it is statistically likely that married or unmarried couples in fact share
income or debts. "Marital" benefits should be awarded to an unmar-
ried couple only if the couple has established by objective evidence
that they are an "economic unit." Once they prove they are a unit,
they should be entitled to all benefits currently awarded only to mar-
ried couples. To accomplish this, I propose that Congress amend the
Code as follows: First, § 101, the Code's definitional section, should
be amended to include the term "economic unit," defined as a public
or private arrangement between members who have a committed rela-
tionship involving shared financial responsibilities. The term "depen-
dent" should also be added to § 101 and should include within its
definition a member of an economic unit. Section 302 should be
amended to permit a joint case to be commenced by the filing of a
petition by both members of an economic unit. Finally, solely for the
purposes of exempting property or preventing a trustee from selling
property, a home owned by an economic unit should be treated as
entirety property-even though the unit could not characterize the
property as entirety property under applicable state law.
To determine what type of proof is sufficient to establish the exist-
ence of an economic unit, bankruptcy courts could rely on the stan-
dards and tests state courts, municipalities, and private employers
have used when deciding whether an unmarried person is entitled to
receive benefits as the "domestic partner" of a person who is entitled
to certain public or private benefits.18 9 For example, when deciding
whether a non-spouse was entitled to certain benefits under a rent
control law, the New York Court of Appeals examined the following
factors: the exclusivity and duration of the partners' relationship;
their families' knowledge of the relationship; the existence of joint as-
sets such as bank accounts, safe deposit boxes and credit cards; and
188. See id. at 105-06.
189. The following municipalities have adopted such laws: Berkeley, San Fran-
cisco, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood, California; Denver, Colorado; Chicago, Illi-
nois; Baltimore and Takoma Park, Maryland; New York, New York; Arlington,
Virginia; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin. Massachusetts, New York
and Vermont also provide limited domestic partner benefits for state workers. In
addition, the following companies and organizations also have extended employee
benefits to unmarried cohabitants: Advanced Micro Devices, American Express, Ap-
ple Computer, Inc., Bank of America, Boston Globe, Coors Brewing Co., Democratic
National Committee, Dow Chemical Co., Eastman Kodak, Holland & Knight, IBM
Corporation, Levi Strauss, Microsoft, New York Times, Northern Telecom, Perot Sys-
tems, St. Petersburg Times, Seattle Times, Time-Warner, Vinson & Elkins, and Walt
Disney Co. See Democrats Give Health Benefits to Gay Couples, N.Y. Times, May 17,
1997, at All; Good News for Partners of Unmarried Employees, Wash. Post, Apr. 19,
1997, at Bi; Mark Hansen, Bolstering Benefits, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1988, at 32; Diana
Kunde, Perot Systems Offers Health Benefits to Employees' Partners, Dallas Morning
News, Dec. 14, 1996, at IF; Sanders, supra note 182.
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whether the partners named each other as beneficiaries in life insur-
ance policies. 190 Municipalities have adopted a number of definitions
and qualifications to determine whether a "domestic partner" is enti-
tled to health coverage. For example, one jurisdiction requires the
partners to show that they are unmarried adults who have lived to-
gether continuously for at least one year and "who have a close and
committed personal relationship involving shared responsibilities." 9 '
Several ordinances require partners to assert that they share the com-
mon necessities of life, that they are jointly responsible for their basic
living expenses, and that they are generally responsible for each
other's welfare.'9 At least one municipality also requires partners to
swear that they intend to remain together indefinitely.1 93 Many mu-
nicipalities require partners to register as domestic partners.19'
If a couple satisfies such a test, they should enjoy marital benefits
irrespective of whether they are in a publicly or privately arranged
relationship. 95 While adopting some of these tests may in fact pre-
vent some married couples from being treated as economic units,
adopting a test that more accurately reflects a couple's economic reali-
ties would help to eliminate the uncertainty concerning who is eligible
to receive benefits based on their involvement in an economic unit.
96
190. See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989).
191. Berger, supra note 15, at 424 (citing New York, N.Y., Executive Order 123
(Aug. 7, 1989)). Several domestic partner ordinances have similar requirements. See
id. at 423-26.
192. See Berger, supra note 15, at 425 (discussing the Santa Cruz, California domes-
tic partnership ordinance); Bowman & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1193 (quoting Los
Angeles, California and Seattle, Washington ordinances).
193. See Berger, supra note 15, at 432 (discussing Santa Cruz domestic partnership
ordinance). In discussing these ordinances, Bowman & Cornish suggest that employ-
ers grant benefits to any person in a domestic partnership as long as both partners are
"responsible for the support of the other" and would limit the definition of support to
the types of items that historically would have been covered by the Doctrine of
Necessaries, i.e., food, clothing, a suitable residence, and medical attention. See Bow-
man & Cornish, supra note 15, at 1206. These authors would also make a party who
fraudulently applied for domestic partnership benefits liable for the value of the bene-
fits received as well as reasonable attorney's fees. See id. at 1211.
194. See Berger, supra note 15, at 424-25 (discussing filing requirements of Santa
Cruz and New York).
195. The court in In re Fisdrel, 103 B.R. 44 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), refused to
confirm a Chapter 13 plan that would be funded by the debtor's significant other even
though the debtor and significant other lived together, pooled income, and had some
joint debts. Id. at 49. Under my proposal, the plan should be confirmed just as courts
routinely confirm Chapter 13 plans funded by non-debtor spouses. See In re Antoine,
208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a non-debtor wife is permitted
to fully fund plan of her unemployed husband). For a discussion regarding how fam-
ily law destroys the marital model and collapses all sexual relationships into a private
category that should not be sanctioned, privileged, or preferred by law, see Fineman,
supra note 22, at 5.
196. Rather than imposing a numerical requirement, Congress could give courts the
discretion to determine the boundaries of "substantial" just as courts currently have
the discretion to decide if a married couple's assets are so intertwined that their cases
should be substantively consolidated. For example, the district court in Austin Bank
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Moreover, because debtors would rely on public, objective evidence in
proving they are an economic unit, this test would reduce transaction
costs for both debtors (who must prove they are an economic unit)
and creditors (who can quickly determine whether a potential bor-
rower is part of an economic unit). While it may be easier to deter-
mine dependency under current law since unmarried couples are
never treated as dependants, such a rule would facilitate dependency
determinations among married debtors. That is, if a creditor objects
to a debtor's attempt to characterize a spouse as a "dependant" de-
spite their status as married, the couple is still required by the Code to
prove their dependency in court.
Some might argue that giving an economic unit the right to claim
benefits currently available only to married debtors potentially ex-
pands the rights unmarried debtors would have under state law.
Notwithstanding this risk, there are a number of reasons why award-
ing benefits based on a couple's economic relationship is preferable to
the current treatment of unmarried couples.
First, awarding bankruptcy benefits to all economic units is consis-
tent with the assumption that some marital benefits (most notably the
right to file a joint petition) should be awarded to spouses because
they are jointly liable on their debts and jointly hold most of their
property. 197 Extending the right to file jointly to unmarried economic
units would further bankruptcy policy by eliminating duplicate filing
and attorney's fees, thereby reducing administrative expenses and al-
lowing those funds to be used for either the debtor's fresh start or
debt repayment. Unlike the subsidies associated with most benefits
awarded based on marital status, awarding bankruptcy benefits to un-
married couples would have little, if any, adverse economic impact on
the government coffers' 98 yet would protect both the debtor's fresh
v. Chan, 113 B.R. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision grant-
ing the debtors' motion to consolidate their estates. See id. at 429. The bankruptcy
court found that 85% of the couple's assets were jointly held and that the debtors'
affairs were too intermingled to be separated. See id. While affirming the decision to
allow the couples assets to be substantively consolidated, the district court noted that
the "degree of intermingling and obscurity [also] might have supported an order de-
nying consolidation." Id.
197. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5818.
198. Extending the benefits married people receive from the government (includ-
ing tax benefits and certain retirement entitlements) would, in most cases, entail addi-
tional costs if those benefits are extended to their unmarried partners. Likewise,
private benefits typically available only to married employees include employee
health benefits, the right to take unpaid leave to care for a spouse, and reduced family
memberships at health clubs or recreational facilities. See, e.g. Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387
(1994)) (outlining criteria for family and medical leave). Extending those benefits to
members of an economic unit also would entail additional costs. In contrast, award-
ing benefits to all economic units most likely poses no additional costs to creditors or
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start and the creditor's desire to be repaid as much of the debt as
possible.
Second, allowing debtors to provide for expenses of their economic
partner is consistent with the policy supporting the Code's treatment
of dependents. Congress most likely allowed debtors to take into ac-
count the economic needs of their dependents (even if not actually
dependent) because it assumed that married couples are economically
linked, or that the person in the family who incurred the debts is also
the one who earns the income. Permitting a debtor either to exempt
property used by, or to budget for the expenses of, the economically
dependent member of the unit is consistent with the paradigm of the
economic provider being allowed to budget for a non-debtor depen-
dent. Moreover, treating a member of an economic unit as a depen-
dent is consistent with the Code's literal definition of dependent,
which includes, but is not limited to, a spouse.199
Finally, because my proposal disregards marital status,2" Congress
could award benefits to a debtor's lover, cohabitant, or common law
spouse yet not be required to recognize same sex or common law
marriages32'
Granting marital benefits to economic units would further bank-
ruptcy policy without expanding a debtor's property rights under state
law. For example, if a mother/daughter economic unit were sued in a
state court, they would be precluded from arguing that their home was
entirety property exempt from seizure, because they are not married
to each other. Under my proposal, they could treat the home as en-
tirety property in a bankruptcy proceeding even though they could not
shield the property from creditors in a state court collection action.
Because the proposal might expand the debtor's right to exercise cer-
tain state property interests in bankruptcy, it may cause some eco-
nomic units to choose a bankruptcy forum to resolve their disputes
the government and has the additional benefit of facilitating the administration of the
two related bankruptcy estates.
199. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (1994) ("'[Dlependent' includes spouse, whether or
not actually dependent.").
200. Cf. William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabi-
tants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 La. L. Rev. 1677, 1716 (1984)
(arguing that legislation creating a status of "lawful cohabitation" would avoid litiga-
tion over whether cohabiting couples should be viewed as married when awarding
federal benefits). See generally Fineman, supra note 22, at 228-30 (arguing for aboli-
tion of marriage as a legal category and with it any privilege based on sexual affilia-
tion in family law and replacing the status relationship with contract, property, tort,
and criminal law doctrines).
201. By ignoring marital status altogether, bankruptcy courts can avoid the horror,
so feared by the supporters of the Defense of Marriage Act, of fanning "[tihe flames
of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, [and] the flames of self-centered morality ...
licking at the very foundation of our society: the family unit." 142 Cong. Rec. H7482
(daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr); see also Berger, supra note 15, at
451 (arguing that domestic partnership laws "should strive to protect alternative fam-
ily arrangements" as opposed to marriage, which is "a distinct and separate goal").
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with creditors." 2 Despite the potential for forum shopping, Congress
should allow economic units (whether married or unmarried) to treat
their home as entirety property in a bankruptcy proceeding because
preventing creditors from foreclosing on a debtor's home is consistent
with bankruptcy policy. Moreover, as discussed in part III.B.3, if Con-
gress has determined that having a place to live is consistent with the
fresh start married debtors need, there is no theoretical justification
for limiting the scope of the fresh start simply because the people who
inhabit the home are not married.
Adopting a functional, economic approach to awarding bankruptcy
benefits is not devoid of risks. First, it requires courts to exercise dis-
cretion when deciding whether a couple has sufficiently demonstrated
that it is an economic unit.20 3 Allowing courts to exercise such discre-
tion may cause some uncertainty and potentially increase administra-
tive costs by requiring an economic unit determination in virtually all
cases involving couples in formal or informal marriages. Evaluating
whether a couple is an economic unit, however, should be a relatively
simple task for bankruptcy courts. First, debtors would be required to
submit objective evidence (i.e., deeds, bank statements, loan docu-
ments, wills, insurance policies, etc.) to prove that they are members
of an economic unit. Moreover, courts are already authorized to per-
form a similar analysis when deciding whether to combine the assets
of married couples who file jointly.
That is, while filing a joint petition causes the couple's separate es-
tates to be jointly administered, it does not require courts to combine
their assets.20 4 Combining, or "substantively consolidating," estates is
the procedure bankruptcy courts use to place the assets of more than
one debtor (or a debtor and a non-debtor) in one joint pool, thereby
giving the creditors of one debtor the right to satisfy their claims from
the assets of another.20 5 While Congress assumed that most married
couples have joint debts and assets, it recognized that some do not
and, accordingly, gave courts the discretion to decide whether the
spouses' assets and liabilities should be combined into a single pool.2 0 6
202. Just as the Code currently attempts to give at least some benefits to homeown-
ers and non-homeowners by allowing the latter group to exempt an additional
amount of personal property because they have no homestead to exempt, see 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(1), (d)(5), the Code could allow both married and unmarried debtors
to exempt a homestead in bankruptcy even if they could not do so under applicable
state law.
203. See Kornhauser, supra note 175, at 71 (raising same concerns when deciding
whether a non-marital economic unit nevertheless should be treated as a taxable
unit).
204. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b).
205. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Reider (In re Reider), 31 F.3d 1102, 1109 (lth
Cir. 1994) (discussing differences between joint administration and substantive
consolidation).
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (giving courts the discretion to "determine the extent, if
any, to which the debtors' estates shall be consolidated"); see also J. Stephen Gilbert,
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Because courts consider whether the spouses' assets and debts are
substantially intertwined before consolidating the cases, bankruptcy
courts already perform the type of test I propose, albeit in another
context.2 7 If courts are competent to determine whether spouses' as-
sets and debts are intertwined, they can also determine whether co-
habitants' assets and debts are intertwined.
Finally, to alleviate any concern that giving unmarried couples mari-
tal benefits will dramatically increase the number of people seeking
those benefits, Congress can always erect a high threshold that re-
quires, for example, a showing that more than 75 percent of their as-
sets or debts are joint.2 0 Having a high joint debt/asset threshold
would have the secondary benefit of alleviating creditor concern that
giving benefits to unmarried couples unfairly alters their rights ex ante.
That is, creditors might argue that it is unfair to force them to subsi-
dize the debtor's choice to become economically entangled with some-
one other than a legal spouse because the creditor insured against
subsidizing only spouses recognized under applicable state law.209
Modem credit practices substantially undermine this argument. Any
prudent creditor would know that a debtor is a member of an eco-
nomic unit because an economic unit, by definition, would own a sub-
stantial number of joint assets and have substantial joint debts. A
simple credit check, which any reasonable creditor would perform,
would disclose that the potential borrower is financially linked to
someone else.21° Moreover, once bankruptcy laws are changed to
Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43 Vand. L Rev. 207. 231 (1990)
(discussing a two-step approach used to decide whether cases will be consolidated).
207. See In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 441 n.10 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994); In re Chan,
113 B.R. 427 (N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Steury, 94 B.R. 553, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988);
In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103, 106 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Scholz, 57 B.R. 259, 262
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); Ohio v. Wilkinson (it re Winston), 24 B.R. 474 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Barnes, 14 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
208. While adopting a very high threshold or adopting the test used by the court in
Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 543 N.E.2d 49, 54-55 (N.Y. 1989), would reduce the
number of unmarried couples who would qualify as an economic unit, it also may
prevent some married couples from receiving the benefits.
209. See Jordan H. Leibman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountants' Liability to Third Par-
ties for Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a Ness Limiting Principle, 30 Am.
Bus. L.J. 345, 423 (1992) ("If a third party creditor... knows ,r ante that there is a
risk that the business to which it trusts its funds... may become judgment-proof; the
third party can assess that risk and adjust the terms of its loan ... accordingly."); see
also Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Banknptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155 (1989) (urging
courts to distinguish uses of bankruptcy that further the e ante bargain and those that
further the interests of only one group).
210. Most loan and credit card applications ask the potential borrower to disclose
joint debts. For larger loans, lenders require debtors to complete a full financial state-
ment that lists all assets and debts. See Letter from F. John Dwyer, Jr., Senior Vice
President, The Old Point National Bank to A. Mechele Dickerson, Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, the College of William and Mary (May 15, 1996) (on file with author).
Even if a debtor does not disclose this information, lenders who enter into a secured
transaction involving real estate routinely check land records to confirm property
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award benefits to all economic units, creditors will adjust their prac-
tices and will protect themselves from adverse bankruptcy treatment
when they determine that a potential borrower is in an economic rela-
tionship with someone else.
CONCLUSION
Many Americans may continue to believe that the only legitimate
relationship between unrelated adults is one that is sanctioned by a
marital tie.211 As the choice to marry is a non-economic right, t how-
ever, and bankruptcy laws are designed to regulate a debtor's eco-
nomic rights, bankruptcy laws should not be used to either promote or
reject this private, non-economic choice. 13 While bankruptcy laws
are often used to respond to public policy issues, 14 to facilitate debt
repayment, and to protect debtors rights to a fresh start, Congress
should grant marital benefits to any type of unit that functions eco-
nomically like a married couple.2 15
Notwithstanding the rhetoric used during the debate over the De-
fense of Marriage Act, 16 awarding bankruptcy benefits based on an
economic rather than a marital association is consistent with the
Code's goals and policies. Adopting this proposal would not, how-
ever, force courts to recognize informal marriages or otherwise be-
come entangled in state family law. Indeed, by ignoring marital status
altogether and instead examining economic involvement, Congress
can avoid deciding whether recognizing informal marriages demeans
or otherwise denigrates the institution of heterosexual marriage217 and
ownership. Moreover, creditors often confirm information obtained from a credit ap-
plicant by contacting the applicant's references and employers and by requesting a
report from a consumer reporting agency. Where a joint applicant is involved, a cred-
itor usually obtains a report on the joint applicant as well. See Federal Regulation of
Consumer Credit T 2.04[2], at 2-32 to 2-33 (American Bar Association Young Lawyers
Division ed., 1981).
211. Professor Martha Fineman has argued that even those who believe that di-
vorced mothers and their children or long-term unmarried cohabitants can constitute
a "family" may still consider single motherhood to be "deviant." Fineman, supra note
22, at 147.
212. This "right" is, of course, made available only to people who choose to marry
someone of the opposite sex.
213. See generally Kandoian, supra note 82 (arguing that the social approval of
marriage and marriage-like relationships affects the legal regulation of marriage).
214. See supra note 111.
215. For a persuasive argument that a sexual relationship between individuals
should not be used to determine whether the individuals constitute a "family" or are
entitled to benefits awarded only to families, see Fineman, supra note 22, at 143-66.
See also In re Allison, 209 B.R. 494 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997) (concluding that a disabled,
alcoholic debtor, his unemployed adult welfare recipient daughter, and his grand-
son-who had severe allergies-should be treated as a household because they pool
their family resources to survive).
216. See supra note 6.
217. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 1979) (expressing concern
that allowing a cohabitant to recover contract damages after the cohabiting relation-
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can move bankruptcy laws closer to the reality of how modern couples
govern their lives both inside and outside of marriage.21 s
ship terminated would make cohabitation an attractive alternative to marriage and
contravene the State's desire to preserve the integrity of marriage); see also Reppy,
supra note 200, at 1683-85 (arguing that allowing cohabitants to obtain legal marriage
benefits will demean marriage); cf Glendon, Marriage and the State, supra note 23, at
692 (observing that historical response to cohabitation was to pretend it was marriage
and then attempt to attribute to it the legal incidents of marriage).
218. Cf Weitzman, Contract, supra note 25, at 227 (arguing for treating marriage as
a contract because it "allows couples to formulate an agreement that conforms to
contemporary social reality" not the "outdated framework of traditional legal mar-
riage"); Shultz, supra note 51, at 333 (arguing that contractual ordering in modem
marriages is necessary because marriage as "a social institution ... has outgrown the
legal structure that used to govern it").
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